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Copyright Arbitrage 
Kristelia A. García* 
Regulatory arbitrage—defined as the manipulation of regulatory 
treatment for the purpose of reducing regulatory costs or increasing 
statutory earnings—is often seen in heavily regulated industries. An 
increase in the regulatory nature of copyright, coupled with rapid 
technological advances and evolving consumer preferences, have led 
to an unprecedented proliferation of regulatory arbitrage in the area 
of copyright law. This Article offers a new scholarly account of the 
phenomenon herein referred to as “copyright arbitrage.” 
In some cases, copyright arbitrage may work to expose and/or 
correct for an extant gap or inefficiency in the regulatory regime. In 
other cases, copyright arbitrage may contravene one or another of 
copyright’s foundational goals of incentivizing the creation of, and 
ensuring access to, copyrightable works. In either case, the existence 
of copyright arbitrage provides strong support for the classification 
(and clarification) of copyright as a complex regulatory regime in 
need of a strong regulatory apparatus. 
 
  DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38DR2P868 
  Copyright © 2019 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their 
publications. 
 *  Associate Professor at the University of Colorado Law School and Director of the Content 
Initiative at the Silicon Flatirons Center for Law, Technology and Entrepreneurship. For their generous 
and helpful comments, the author thanks Michael Abramowicz, Eric Alston, Ian Ayres, Robert Brauneis, 
Ben Depoorter, Eric Gerding, Jim Gibson, Mark Lemley, Yvette Liebesman, Jessica Litman, Barak 
Orbach, Gideon Parchomovsky, Blake Reid, Matthew Sag, Andrew Schwartz, Sloan Speck, Harry 
Surden, Rebecca Tushnet, Phil Weiser, and the participants of the St. Louis University School of Law 
Faculty Workshop, Yale Law School’s ISP Speaker Series, and the University of Pennsylvania’s Third 
Annual Copyright Roundtable. For their generous support, the author thanks the Honorable Nancy F. 
Atlas IP Inn of Court and the Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law (IPIL). A special 
thanks to Rachael Smith, and to Jane Thompson and the Colorado Law Library team for their excellent 
research assistance, and to Daniel Yablon, Martha Reiser, and the editors at the California Law Review 
without whom this Article would be far less readable. Accolades and compliments, and criticism 
couched as such, are welcome at kristelia@colorado.edu. 
200 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:199 
This Article discusses several options available for identifying 
and curbing problematic copyright arbitrage. First, courts can take a 
purposive, substantive approach to interpretations of the Copyright 
Act. Second, Congress can empower a regulatory agency with 
rulemaking and enforcement authority. Finally, antitrust law can help 
to curb the anticompetitive effects of copyright arbitrage resulting 
from legislative capture. 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 201 
I. Regulatory Arbitrage ........................................................................... 206 
A. The Theory of Regulatory Arbitrage ................................... 206 
B. Conditions Promoting Regulatory Arbitrage ....................... 209 
1. Regulatory-Regime Inconsistency ................................. 209 
2. Economic Substance Inconsistency ............................... 210 
3. Time Inconsistency ........................................................ 210 
C. Constraints on Regulatory Arbitrage ................................... 211 
1. Legal Constraints ........................................................... 211 
2. Transaction Costs .......................................................... 212 
3. Reputational Concerns ................................................... 213 
II. Copyright Arbitrage ........................................................................... 214 
A. The Impetus for Contemporary Copyright Arbitrage .......... 214 
B. Examples of Copyright Arbitrage ........................................ 216 
1. Section 114 Arbitrage: Pandora’s Terrestrial Radio  
Station ............................................................................ 217 
2. Section 115 Arbitrage: Mass “Address Unknown” Notices 
of Intent .......................................................................... 219 
3. Section 109(a) Arbitrage ................................................ 224 
a. ReDigi’s Second-Hand Digital Music Marketplace 224 
b. “Buy Now” Buttons for Licenses ........................... 227 
4. Section 110(11) Arbitrage: VidAngel’s Filtered Streaming 
Service ........................................................................... 227 
5. Section 106(4) Arbitrage ............................................... 229 
a. Aereo’s “Private” Broadcasts ................................. 229 
b. Downloads, Samples & Public Performances ........ 231 
6. Section 512 Arbitrage .................................................... 233 
a. YouTube’s Alleged “Value Gap” ........................... 233 
b. Improper Takedown Notices .................................. 237 
III. Implications ...................................................................................... 238 
A. Incentives & Inefficiency .................................................... 240 
B. Anticompetitive Effects ....................................................... 243 
C. Distributive Justice .............................................................. 247 
D. Consumer Expectations ....................................................... 248 
E. Correction, Information-Forcing & Signaling ..................... 249 
IV. Mitigation ......................................................................................... 250 
2019] COPYRIGHT ARBITRAGE 201 
A. Legislative Response ........................................................... 250 
1. Subject Matter Expertise ................................................ 251 
2. Timeliness ...................................................................... 252 
3. Capture ........................................................................... 253 
B. Judicial Response ................................................................. 254 
C. Administrative Response: A Proposal ................................. 257 
1. Copyright as a Regulatory Regime ................................ 257 
2. Call for a Regulatory Apparatus .................................... 258 
3. Application .................................................................... 260 
D. Antitrust ............................................................................... 264 
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 265 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Babyface, Bon Jovi, Cher, Chicago, Katy Perry, and Lady Gaga—this may 
sound like a Grammy lineup, but it actually constitutes only a fraction of the 186 
recording artists who signed a June 2016 petition asking Congress to fix the law 
that they claim allows YouTube to shirk proper payment for the music it uses.1 
Meanwhile, a slew of artists ranging from Frankie Valli & the Four Seasons to 
Guns N’ Roses, have filed “staggering”2 lawsuits—explicitly rejecting a 
settlement offer of $43.45 million—against Spotify alleging that it failed to pay 
statutory royalties under Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright 
Act).3 In both scenarios, the platforms in question are in technical compliance 
with the letter of the law, while simultaneously reducing, or altogether denying, 
royalties paid to copyright owners. 
At fault for this convoluted state of affairs is regulatory arbitrage, or the 
reduction of regulatory costs via manipulation of regulatory treatment. All 
regulatory regimes are vulnerable to manipulation; it arises in diverse areas of 
 
 1. Tim Ingham, Revealed: The 186 Artists Fighting the Youtube-Shielding DMCA, MUSIC 
BUS. WORLDWIDE (June 21, 2016), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/revealed-the-186-
artists-protesting-against-youtube-shielding-dmca-laws [https://perma.cc/TTL6-XUQU]. 
 2. Eriq Gardner, Spotify Hit with Two Lawsuits Claiming “Staggering” Copyright 
Infringement, HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 18, 2017), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/spotify-
hit-two-lawsuits-claiming-staggering-copyright-infringement-1021771 [https://perma.cc/R5CM-
S9V6]. 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). 
202 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:199 
the law, ranging from tax4 to immigration5 to bankruptcy6 and even criminal 
law.7 As a specialized type of regulatory manipulation, regulatory arbitrage has 
been described as “exploit[ing] the gap between the economic substance of a 
transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of the legal 
system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that track the 
economics of the transactions with sufficient precision,”8 and also as a means to 
“reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations 
or laws.”9 Regulatory arbitrage allows regulated entities to “invest in close 
economic substitutes but with lower regulatory costs.”10 
Regulatory arbitrage is conventionally viewed as the inevitable result of 
inherent ambiguity and incompleteness of legal rules. Sometimes referred to as 
“avoision,”11 such regulatory manipulation allows for “the avoidance of laws in 
ways that evade the law’s intent or purpose but do not actually constitute 
unlawful behavior.”12 Most commonly seen in finance and tax, regulatory 
arbitrage has also transpired in copyright since at least the 1920s. The jukebox 
was arguably a transparent attempt to exploit an exception to the public 
performance right, which intended to exempt operators of penny arcades (but 
that used the language “coin-operated machines”).13 Recently, technological 
advances—especially those relating to duplication and distribution—and 
increasing consumer demand for digital content have sparked a rapid 
 
 4. Perhaps no other area of law is as closely associated with regulatory manipulation as tax. 
Abuses are so prevalent that the Internal Revenue Service maintains a running list of so-called 
“Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions.” Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/listed-transactions#10 
[https://perma.cc/56WU-9C7D]; see also infra Part IV.D. Some examples from this list include offshore 
deferred compensation arrangements, sale-in lease-out transactions, and basket option contracts. 
 5. Historically, the most common regulatory manipulation in immigration law was something 
known as “bootstrapping,” wherein a foreign national comes to the United States on a visitor’s visa and  
promptly commits some act of political activism—distribution of literature, say—that would make him 
a target in his home country, thereby enabling him to claim political asylum. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, WHY 
THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 76, 114 (2011). 
 6. The classic example of regulatory manipulation in bankruptcy involves the shifting of one’s 
assets to protected categories, such as a home. 
 7. Rather than walk up to her arch nemesis with a gun, a would-be murderer might instead 
intentionally provoke her foe into attacking first, so that she can later claim self-defense. 
 8. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). 
 9. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 
211, 227 (1997). 
 10. ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 236 (2014). 
 11. The term, intended to connote both evasion and avoidance, was first coined academically 
by Leo Katz. LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES 
OF THE LAW 4 (1996). In the same year, an episode of the popular TV series The Simpsons featured the 
phrase in reference to Krusty the Klown’s “massive tax avoision.” The Simpsons: Bart the Fink (Fox 
television broadcast Feb. 11, 1996). It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine who copied whom. 
 12. Ronald Turner, Reactions of the Regulated: A Federal Labor Law Example, 17 LAB. LAW. 
479, 479 (2002) (discussing avoision in the labor law context). 
 13. Subsection 1(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909 was the predecessor to the current Act’s 
Section 106(4). For more on the story of the jukebox, see H.R. REP. NO. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7–
9 (1909), and Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 350–54 (2002). 
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proliferation of the phenomenon. This Article offers a new scholarly account of 
copyright arbitrage. 
The scant literature discussing regulatory manipulation in copyright to date 
has focused primarily on technological avoision, or attempts to code or design 
around regulation.14 In his work on code as a technological mechanism of 
avoision, Tim Wu describes the evolution of peer-to-peer (P2P) network design 
as a reaction to Napster’s legal demise.15 Similarly, Dan Burk portrays the 
development of mutagenic crops—i.e., crops whose genome has been altered by 
chemical or radiation treatments—as a means of emulating the same desirable 
characteristics as GMO crops (such as pest resistance), but without falling under 
arduous GMO regulation.16 Where technological avoision aims to avoid 
illegality (as in the case of P2P networks), or to dodge prohibition (as in the case 
of mutagenic crops), regulatory arbitrage straightforwardly aims to lower an 
entity’s cost of doing business. It is the latter that constitutes copyright arbitrage. 
Copyright is a notoriously complicated statutory regime that regulates 
industries, such as music, film, and publishing, whose business models have been 
dramatically impacted by technology. This makes the field ripe for regulatory 
arbitrage, which falls into two frequently overlapping categories: (1) 
ontological—i.e., the manipulation of a statutory definition so as to either avoid 
regulatory scrutiny, or to benefit from preferential statutory treatment; and (2) 
exploitative—i.e., the utilization of a regulation for purposes at odds with the 
statute’s purported legislative intent. As explained further in Part II, an example 
of ontological copyright arbitrage is Pandora’s purchase of a terrestrial radio 
station in order to take advantage of the lower statutory royalty rate afforded to 
mixed-use companies. An example of exploitative copyright arbitrage is a 
copyright owner’s issuance of an unfounded takedown notice. 
As with economic arbitrage, regulatory arbitrage is not necessarily 
detrimental to social welfare. In some contexts, regulatory arbitrage may serve 
as an impetus for technological innovation, or may signal to Congress an extant 
imbalance in statutory treatment of similarly situated entities, potentially 
resulting in societal benefit on balance.17 As described further in Part I, Burk 
describes examples of technological innovation as a potential serendipitous 
byproduct of attempted manipulation of a regulatory scheme.18 In their work on 
“carrots and sticks” in innovation, Ian Ayres and Amy Kapczynski cite the 
 
 14. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Perverse Innovation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2016) (describing 
how technological regulation can lead to innovation designed to avoid the regulation that prompted it); 
Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003) (discussing code as a mechanism of 
technological avoidance). 
 15. Wu, supra note 14, at 726–45. 
 16. Burk, supra note 14, at 3–5. 
 17. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 125 (2011) (reviewing a series of technological innovations and arguing that concerns 
regarding negative impact on the copyright industry are often overblown). 
 18. See id. 
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development of more energy-efficient cars and lightbulbs as a direct result of 
regulatory avoision.19 Likewise, in some cases copyright arbitrage works to 
expose and correct extant gaps or inefficiencies in the regulatory regime. For 
example, and as discussed further in Part II.B.1, Pandora exposed a significant 
regulatory gap when it purchased a local terrestrial radio station for no business 
purpose other than to lower its royalty rate—a rate nearly double that of similarly 
situated Internet radio services with a terrestrial component. 
In other cases, however, copyright arbitrage may contravene one or another 
of copyright’s foundational goals of incentivizing the creation of, and ensuring 
access to, copyrightable works.20 Depending on the circumstances, arbitrage in 
the copyright context may thwart the incentive theory of copyright21 by reducing 
the financial benefit that copyright protection affords rights holders (when 
perpetrated by users of content), or may contravene users’ rights and shrink the 
public domain (when perpetrated by rightsholders). From a welfare perspective, 
this suggests that some of the instances of copyright arbitrage described herein 
arguably either: (1) improve both user access (to content that might otherwise 
have been unavailable or unaffordable) and platform profits (since regulatory 
avoision reduces costs), but leave copyright owners worse off (since they are 
paid less than they’d otherwise be paid in a world without arbitrage); or (2) 
increase copyright owners’ earnings (e.g., by inflating rates or restricting access), 
but leave users and platforms worse off (since access is lowered and/or rates are 
increased). In either case, copyright arbitrage upsets the intended balance struck 
by Congress. 
The blame for the potential problems posed by copyright arbitrage rarely 
lies with the companies, content owners, or users that engage in it; in most cases, 
these parties are acting rationally and predictably. The problem lies instead with 
copyright regulation itself, and its inability to anticipate, and to keep up with, 
rapidly evolving technology and its distributional effects. In the context of 
economic (as opposed to regulatory) arbitrage, the policy implications of shifting 
market allocations take a backseat to market effects, which tend to be net-
neutral.22 Copyright, on the other hand, is uniquely concerned with initial 
allocations, such that their manipulation may not always be net-neutral in effect. 
Unlike economic arbitrage, then, copyright arbitrage cannot always be accurately 
characterized as mere wealth transfer. Instead, copyright arbitrage may result in 
 
 19. Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures 
to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1812–27 (2015). 
 20. I.e., the “incentive-access” paradigm, or the inherent tension between incentivizing creators 
to produce new works on the one hand, and ensuring consumer access to those works on the other. See 
generally, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentive-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 483 (1996) (discussing the paradox created by the paradigm’s attempt at balance). 
 21. The incentive theory of copyright says that society encourages the production of creative 
works by offering protections designed to maximize financial rewards for creators. Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the 
use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
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wealth reduction for the very parties (be they creators or users) that the 
legislature intended be rewarded and protected by the regime. When this is the 
case, it stands in direct contravention of copyright’s constitutional mandate to 
“promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.”23 
That copyright arbitrage frustrates the production or dissemination of 
creative expression assumes current copyright protections are set at optimal 
levels of strength and duration; otherwise, arbitrage may simply correct an over- 
or under-protective copyright regime. To put it mildly, this is by no means a 
foregone conclusion, neither in the literature nor in practice. Indeed, the 
consensus among many intellectual property (IP) scholars is that the current 
copyright term—life of the author plus seventy years (or, in the case of works 
made for hire, ninety-five years from the date of distribution, or 120 years from 
the date of creation, whichever comes first)—is too long.24 Future work will 
expand upon nascent empirical work in this area by considering the commercial 
half-life of information goods.25 In the meantime, this Article will suggest that 
where copyright arbitrage is determined to be problematic, the potential 
mitigation approaches proposed in Part IV hold even in the likely event that 
protections are sub-optimal. 
In sum, where copyright arbitrage works to expose a statutory rate as 
miscalculated, or as potentially discouraging or thwarting innovative and/or 
creative efforts, it may be best to let such arbitrage lie, so that it can serve as a 
signal to legislators and rate-setting bodies that adjustment is needed. In these 
cases, copyright arbitrage may expose extant inefficiencies. Alternately, in cases 
where copyright arbitrage may lead to market inefficiency, raise distributive 
justice concerns, impact consumer expectations, or have anticompetitive 
consequences, this Article suggests that the best means of mitigating copyright 
arbitrage’s negative impact might be a more proactive judiciary, coupled with an 
empowered administrative body, and backed up by antitrust law. 
This Article’s first contribution is descriptive: using a series of recent 
developments from the copyright industries as examples, it describes a 
phenomenon that to date has not received much scholarly attention—that of 
copyright arbitrage. Part I begins with the basics of regulatory arbitrage theory, 
 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 24. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 350 (1970) (“The period of copyright 
protection is at present too long and should not be extended beyond fifty-six years.”); Brief of George 
A. Akerlof et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846, at *3 
(“Taken as a whole, it is highly unlikely that the economic benefits from copyright extension under the 
CTEA outweigh the additional costs.”). But see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual 
Property Law Association in Support of Respondents, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618), 2002 WL 1822117, at *16–17 (“[E]xtending the term of existing copyrights makes it easier for 
copyright holders, and other creators, to pursue opportunities to further develop, disseminate, and exploit 
existing works.”). 
 25. See Kristelia A. García & Justin McCrary, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Term 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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and considers whether, when, and how it applies in the copyright context. Part II 
presents several recent examples of copyright arbitrage. Using these examples, 
Part III discusses the potential implications of copyright arbitrage in the relevant 
markets. 
This Article also offers a normative contribution: Part IV calls for 
recognition of copyright as a regulatory system in need of a regulatory apparatus. 
In cases where copyright arbitrage is determined to be problematic, it offers some 
thoughts on how administrative agencies, Congress, and the courts might 
mitigate its negative impacts. Specifically, the Article commends a three-
pronged approach to identifying, and curbing, problematic copyright arbitrage. 
First, courts can take a purposive, substantive approach to interpretations of the 
Copyright Act. Second, Congress can empower a regulatory agency with 
rulemaking and enforcement authority. Finally, antitrust law can help to curb the 
anticompetitive effects of copyright arbitrage resulting from legislative capture. 
I. 
REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 
When faced with regulation, a regulated entity can either comply or not. 
Compliance can be conditional—e.g., provisional compliance simultaneous with 
a regulatory challenge, in court or via lobbyist—or unconditional. 
Noncompliance likewise comes in various forms: a regulated entity can disobey, 
in whole or in part, and pay the penalty (monetary or otherwise), or it can engage 
in various regulatory manipulations. Where the compliance decision is 
essentially a cost-benefit analysis, a regulated entity may engage in regulatory 
arbitrage. This framing helps to clarify regulatory arbitrage as a legal form of 
regulatory noncompliance. This Section lays out the theoretical underpinnings 
of regulatory arbitrage, the conditions that encourage it, and the factors that limit 
it. 
A. The Theory of Regulatory Arbitrage 
Economic arbitrage—i.e., the practice of taking advantage of a difference 
in price between markets—can be beneficial, or harmful, or can simply amount 
to net-neutral wealth transfer.26 Similarly, regulatory arbitrage may be 
problematic, or may work to correct legislative imbalances, or both (since any 
policy change thus effected is likely driven by private actors and not by 
Congress). 
The circumstances in which regulatory arbitrage may prove beneficial vary. 
For example, where a regulation is driven by special interests in the first place, 
 
 26. For a classic account of economic arbitrage, see, for example, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35 (1997) (citing WILLIAM F. SHARPE & GORDON J. 
ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS (4th ed. 1990)) (defining arbitrage as “the simultaneous purchase and sale 
of the same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for advantageously different 
prices”). 
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regulatory arbitrage may help to mitigate the overall reduction in social 
welfare.27 Occasional arbitrage may also come to be accepted, and even relied 
upon, in certain regulatory settings. The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) so-
called “Wall Street Rule,” for example, refers to the agency’s position that it will 
not challenge a transaction “if there is a long-standing and generally accepted 
understanding of [the] expected tax treatment.”28 In a phenomenon known as 
“planning drift,” continued manipulation of this sort can actually influence 
public policy over time.29 
The so-called “sharing economy”—Uber, Airbnb, and the like—is often 
cited as a form of regulatory arbitrage that takes advantage of divergent 
regulatory frameworks. These “regulatory entrepreneurs”—companies for 
whom “changing the law [is] a material part of [their] business plan”30—are 
frequently credited with exposing outdated or needless regulation. Uber is still a 
profit-maximizing entity, however, and need not take societal benefit into 
consideration when pushing for regulatory change. This can lead to regulatory 
capture. 
Finally, where similarly situated entities are engaging in regulatory 
arbitrage, it might be irrational from a wealth maximization perspective for a 
company not to do the same. For example, most corporate statutes restrict a 
firm’s ability to declare and pay dividends that exceed the stated capital of the 
firm.31 To avoid this regulation and the costly liability that comes with it, 
corporate boards will often set an exceedingly small par value per share (or, 
where allowed, no par value at all).32 
On the other hand, some regulatory arbitrage can be problematic. This is 
because at its core, regulatory arbitrage is distortionary behavior that can thwart 
regulatory intent and disadvantage actors who play by the rules. For example, 
large pharmaceutical companies’ exploitation of Federal Drug Administration 
loopholes has allowed those companies to block generic competitors by 
preventing them from conducting studies required for approval, thereby delaying 
those companies’ entry into the market.33 This delay denies consumers the option 
 
 27. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
191 (2012) (describing lobbyists as threatening economic welfare by facilitating rent-seeking, capturing 
legislators, and wasting government resources). 
 28. See Emily A. Parker, Acting Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Address at the 
TEI/LMSB Financial Services Industry Conference (Sept. 22, 2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/tei-92203.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMC6-GZNY]. 
 29. Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 549 (2016) (introducing 
the term “planning drift,” and offering examples of the phenomenon in the federal tax context). 
 30. Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
383, 385 (2017). 
 31. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (1953). 
 32. Take, for example, Yahoo’s most recent tender offer, with a par value of $0.001 per share. 
INNISFREE, YAHOO!: TENDER OFFER, http://www.innisfreema.com/tender/yhoo 
[https://perma.cc/6ANE-APXP] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
 33. See, e.g., Zachary Brennan, ‘FAST’ Generics Act Seeks to Thwart Abuse of FDA Safety 
Programs, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
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of lower-cost drugs. The Fair Access for Safe and Timely Generics Act of 2017 
(FAST) was recently introduced in hope of reducing the anticompetitive 
exploitation of these loopholes.34 
Regulatory arbitrage is typically characterized as either ontological, 
technological, or both.35 In addition, and as discussed further in this Article, all 
regulatory arbitrage is arguably exploitative, in the sense that it seeks to 
manipulate—for better or for worse—some loophole in the regulatory regime. 
For this reason, the examples discussed in Part II.B are classified as either 
exploitative, or both exploitative and ontological. Ontological regulatory 
arbitrage allows an entity to either switch to, or away from, a particular label, 
depending on whether it aims to avoid, or to bring itself under, a particular 
regulation. An example is when a business decides to incorporate offshore to 
avoid paying domestic taxes. 
Technological regulatory arbitrage entails coding, designing, or otherwise 
innovating around a regulation so as to avoid its purview altogether. For 
example, Wu describes the intentional design choices of early P2P platforms 
Gnutella and KaZaa as “founded on concepts of radical decentralization” and 
“clearly designed to avoid the copyright lawsuit that had befallen Napster.”36 To 
be clear, the platforms’ design-around did not eliminate, or even mitigate, the 
copyright infringement concern; nonetheless, “[t]o date, neither GnutellaNet nor 
its main application designers have been sued, despite the substantial volume of 
infringement they facilitate,”37 demonstrating that technical compliance with the 
law may excuse failure to comply with its spirit. 
Burk offers the case of Chrysler’s PT Cruiser vehicle as an example that 
fits into both the ontological and technological arbitrage categories: the PT 
Cruiser’s design—characterized by the unique distance of its wheels both from 
each other and from the sides of the vehicle—was less an attempt to evoke the 
styling of the 1930s, and more an attempt to classify itself as a “light truck” 
instead of a “passenger car,” thereby avoiding costly fuel efficiency 
regulations.38 The bet paid off: at 1.3 million units sold, the PT Cruiser was 
declared a “massive sales success,” with sales “beyond anything Chrysler could 
have imagined.”39 
 
Focus/News/2017/04/10/27309/%E2%80%98FAST%E2%80%99-Generics-Act-Seeks-to-Thwart-
Abuse-of-FDA-Safety-Programs [https://perma.cc/S6CS-WUXP]. 
 34. Fair Access for Safe and Timely Generics Act of 2017, 115th Cong. (2017), 
http://freepdfhosting.com/7c07f4d41e.pdf [https://perma.cc/744E-SQ5H] (proposed bill text as of April 
6, 2017). 
 35. See Burk, supra note 14, at 15–18. 
 36. Wu, supra note 14, at 731. 
 37. Id. at 732. 
 38. Burk, supra note 14, at 7. 
 39. Nadeem Muaddi, Chrysler Discontinues PT Cruiser, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 30, 
2010), https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/daily-news/100630-chrysler-discontinues-pt-cruiser 
[https://perma.cc/3NQH-TUEK]. 
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Where this Article describes regulatory arbitrage as exploitative, it means 
to say that instead of merely manipulating its categorization—i.e., ontological 
arbitrage—an entity might affirmatively utilize a statutory regime for ends at 
odds with a statute’s purported legislative intent. An example is the so-called 
“double-dip” lease, in which a company in one jurisdiction buys something—
say, a building—and leases it to a company in another jurisdiction, such that each 
is treated as the “owner” in their respective jurisdiction, with each enjoying 
depreciation on the asset.40 In this example, the regulated entities are actively 
taking advantage of the depreciation rules, but doing so in a way that diverges 
from the legislative intent behind those rules in order to reduce their regulatory 
costs. 
Coase and transaction cost economics tell us that a rational entity will 
structure its dealings in such a way as to minimize transaction costs.41 When a 
firm or individual engages in regulatory arbitrage, however, it may actually 
assume higher transaction costs in exchange for lower regulatory costs. As 
Fleischer explains, “So long as the regulatory savings outweigh the increase in 
transaction costs, such planning is perfectly rational.”42 Owing to regulatory cost 
savings, both ontological and exploitative arbitrage result in overall cost savings, 
even if transaction costs are higher. The next two Sections discuss other 
conditions for, and constraints on, the occurrence of regulatory arbitrage, both 
generally and in copyright specifically. 
B. Conditions Promoting Regulatory Arbitrage 
In his work on regulatory arbitrage, Victor Fleischer borrows from financial 
arbitrage theory to establish a taxonomy of inconsistencies under which 
regulatory arbitrage is likely to take place. This Section will consider each in turn 
as they apply in the copyright context. 
1. Regulatory-Regime Inconsistency 
The first condition under which regulatory arbitrage is likely to arise is 
“regulatory-regime inconsistency,” which occurs when the same transaction 
receives different regulatory treatment under different regulatory regimes.43 This 
doctrinal inconsistency may result from outdated laws, or from divergent policy 
goals from one industry, or jurisdiction, to the next.44 The classic example of 
arbitrage stemming from regulatory-regime inconsistency is the decision by a 
 
 40. See Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1128 n.46 (2002) 
(discussing double dipping in the lease context). 
 41. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386–405 (1937). 
 42. Fleischer, supra note 8, at 231; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business 
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 298 (1984) (describing the trade-off between 
transaction costs and regulatory costs as demonstrative of the value added to a transaction by a business 
lawyer). 
 43. Fleischer, supra note 8, at 244–52. 
 44. Id. at 244–47. 
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company to incorporate in a state like Delaware, with its more favorable tax 
treatment (among other advantages). As a regime, copyright is infamous for its 
inability to keep up with rapidly changing technology, and for its heavily lobbied 
rules affording different treatment—including differing statutory rates—to 
otherwise similarly situated parties. These issues make copyright particularly 
vulnerable to this brand of arbitrage. 
2. Economic Substance Inconsistency 
The second type of inconsistency—“economic substance inconsistency”—
can take place within a single jurisdiction and involves changing the formal 
structure of a business deal without affecting the underlying transaction.45 This 
type of regulatory arbitrage can range from the simple to the elaborate. A 
common example is the total-return swap, which Fleischer describes as a means 
of avoiding dividend tax by running earnings through an investment bank46: 
same result, but different regulatory treatment. With its fungible, and often 
ambiguous categories for both licensors and licensees, copyright law is also 
susceptible to this type of inconsistency. 
3. Time Inconsistency 
The third and final inconsistency condition outlined by Fleischer is that of 
“time inconsistency.” It derives from the differential treatment of a transaction 
over time.47 Where a regulated entity knows that a new law is coming, for 
example, it can work to delay a transaction so as to benefit from favorable 
treatment under the new law.48 The call for a “next great Copyright Act,”49 
coupled with the fact that copyright has not undergone comprehensive revision 
since 1976, make it highly vulnerable to time-based arbitrage. The 
grandfathering of existing music services under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) is a prime example of this vulnerability. The DMCA 
establishes four categories of digital audio services which can be broken down 
broadly into preexisting and other. Preexisting services are subject to the rate 
standard set forth in Section 801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act—a four-factor 
standard that notably does not consider the market rate. Other digital audio 
services, both subscription and nonsubscription, are subject to rates set by the 
Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), which intended to emulate fair market value 
by considering what a willing buyer and willing seller would agree to in a 
 
 45. Id. at 247–48. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 248–49. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013). 
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hypothetical free market. This allows SiriusXM, a preexisting service, to pay a 
lower effective rate than comparably situated latecomers.50 
Fleischer emphasizes that successful regulatory arbitrage does not require 
economically or strategically identical transactions; close substitutes are 
sufficient.51 In other words, two possible deal structures—one facing high 
regulatory costs and the other minimizing or avoiding them—need merely be 
similar enough. So long as the regulatory savings under the substitute transaction 
outweigh any additional transaction costs that may be incurred, a rational entity 
will engage in regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory-regime, economic substance, and 
time inconsistencies abound in the copyright context, thereby encouraging 
regulatory arbitrage in the space. 
C. Constraints on Regulatory Arbitrage 
Several factors may constrain how and when entities might elect to engage 
in regulatory arbitrage, even where the requisite conditions exist. In addition to 
the need for an economically and strategically close substitute transaction, 
Fleischer adds the following potential constraints on the ability to successfully 
engage in regulatory arbitrage: legal, transaction costs, professional, ethical, and 
political.52 
1. Legal Constraints 
Some regulatory regimes have explicit rules intended to discourage 
arbitrage opportunities anticipated, or later discovered, by lawmakers. One 
example is proposed Section 710 of the tax code, which contains a provision 
treating general partners’ debt-financed investments as if they carried interest.53 
This proposal represents Congress’s attempt to curb the regulatory arbitrage 
move of avoiding carried interest by borrowing from limited investors.54 
Other regulatory regimes have broader rules aimed not at a specific 
maneuver, but rather at an entire category of suspect transactions, or aimed at 
curbing all manner of regulatory avoidance more generally. Some examples 
include the passive loss rules in tax (aimed not at any specific deal structure, but 
rather at all tax shelter activity),55 and the common law constraints on tax 
 
 50. See, e.g., SoundExchange Statement: Copyright Royalty Board Issues Decision in Royalty 
Rate Determination Case, SOUNDEXCHANGE (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.soundexchange.com/news/soundexchange-statement-copyright-royalty-board-issues-
decision-royalty-rate-determination-case [https://perma.cc/DLB8-8V5B]. 
 51. Fleischer, supra note 8, at 250–51. 
 52. Id. at 252–74. 
 53. Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. (2007) (introducing the 
bill); see also Howard Abrams, A Technical Analysis of Proposed Section 710 (Emory Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 07-25, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031770## 
[https://perma.cc/RGZ8-YMF5]. 
 54. Fleischer, supra note 8, at 253. 
 55. Id. at 255–56. 
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avoidance: substance-over-form, economic substance doctrine (also known as 
the “sham transaction doctrine”), business purpose doctrine, and the step 
transaction doctrine.56 Notably, copyright does not currently have any explicit 
rules aimed at curbing regulatory arbitrage. 
2. Transaction Costs 
What Fleischer calls “transaction costs” might be more accurately called 
“frictions,” as they refer not only to Coasean transaction costs, but also to risk 
aversion, search costs, and information asymmetry.57 The costs of regulatory 
avoidance, then, go beyond the typical transaction costs necessary to conduct a 
transaction, such as attorneys’ fees, to also include costs associated with financial 
reporting, adverse selection, agency costs, and moral hazard.58 Where an entity 
nonetheless engages in regulatory arbitrage, we can assume that the regulatory 
cost savings outweigh the sum total of various frictional costs. 
Given the disparity in size and sophistication between different licensors 
and licensees of copyrighted content, a likely source of friction in copyright 
arbitrage is a difference in bargaining power. Prior work on private ordering in 
copyright has detailed this concern as one of adverse selection: larger, more 
powerful parties opt out of a regulatory regime, leaving smaller, weaker parties 
behind.59 
In 2012, for example, singer-songwriter Taylor Swift and media 
conglomerate Clear Channel struck a deal in which Clear Channel agreed to pay 
Swift a terrestrial performance royalty (an obligation that does not exist under 
current copyright law) in exchange for a lower-than-statutory digital 
performance royalty.60 In addition to opting out of Section 114’s statutory 
royalty scheme, this agreement also released the parties from the statutory 
 
 56. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶¶ 4.3.3–.5 (3d ed. Cum. Supp. No. 3 2017) [hereinafter BITTKER]. The substance-
over-form doctrine allows the IRS to reclassify a transaction according to its substance, regardless of the 
form that it takes. The business purpose doctrine allows the IRS to challenge and disallow claimed 
business expenses for which it finds no legitimate business purpose (such as a nonexistent home office). 
A transaction satisfies the economic substance test if it has both substantive economic effects and a 
purpose other than reducing or avoiding tax. Finally, the step transaction test enables the IRS to collapse 
a series of separate transactions into one single transaction for the purposes of determining the proper 
tax consequences. Id. 
 57. See Fleischer, supra note 8, at 257–59. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Kristelia A. García, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1117 (2014). This is not merely a fairness argument. For example, a company like Spotify may 
find it worthwhile to engage in private deals only with respect to its high-value content and artists, but 
not others, leaving smaller players to the regulatory regime. In the case of musical content, this means 
that a performance rights organization (PRO) like the American Society of Composers, Authors, and 
Publishers (ASCAP) may find itself both diminished in funding (since it is collecting less money in both 
membership fees and royalties), and less efficient (with a blanket license offering that is less valuable 
with high-value content extracted.). 
 60. Id. at 1137. 
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obligation to pay third parties (in this case, session musicians and backup 
singers).61 In other words, a potentially good deal for Swift, but not so great for 
the smaller musicians whose royalty expectations were retroactively eliminated. 
Similarly, in 2014, two of the country’s three major music publishing 
companies withdrew their digital performance rights from the American Society 
of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), the performance rights 
organization that had previously administered those rights.62 This left smaller 
publishing companies and individual songwriters (who lack the capacity to 
withdraw) holding the bag for the majority of ASCAP’s overhead (derived 
almost entirely from the analog side of the business). 
In both of these instances, prohibitive transaction costs excluded the 
adversely affected parties from the substitute transaction. 
3. Reputational Concerns 
The final three constraint categories outlined by Fleischer are professional, 
ethical, and political. He describes professional constraints as “institutional 
constraints that follow from being a member of the legal profession and a partner 
at a law firm”; ethical constraints as “personal moral obligations specific to 
lawyers as individuals, separate from any professional or institutional pressures”; 
and political constraints as “pressures not to proceed with the planning strategy 
separate from any legal, professional, ethical, or moral concern.”63 
In the copyright context, these three constraint categories can be described 
jointly as “reputational concerns.” While copyright lawyers are subject to the 
professional and ethical rules of their respective jurisdictions, and those of the 
state and federal courts in which they practice, all players in the copyright 
space—from content owners to platforms to collective rights organizations—
engage in continuous, repeat interactions, making reputation an important 
consideration in the regulatory arbitrage calculus. 
In a world with only three major music publishers, and only three major 
performance rights organizations, reputational concerns can play a significant 
role in constraining copyright arbitrage. The role may be retaliatory: licensors 
wishing to show their displeasure with a licensee’s move to lower its royalties 
vis-à-vis a certain use of content through arbitrage might, for example—
assuming they steer clear of collusion and other antitrust concerns—decide to 
charge the company more for a different use of that same content. The role might 
also be preemptive: licensors unhappy with an arbitrage move that takes 
advantage of a time delay in copyright registrations might begin filing those 
registrations several months before the actual release of new content. 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Kristelia A. García, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 183, 189 (2016). 
 63. Fleischer, supra note 8, at 265. 
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Repeat interaction may also contribute to the role of political constraint in 
the copyright context. All proposed copyright legislation and amendments come 
before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and 
the Internet. As many of the committee members serve repeat terms, it is in the 
best interest of parties who may be seeking to advance a particular piece of 
legislation not to engage in transactions potentially viewed as abusive or 
exploitative. 
As the examples in the next Section demonstrate, a copyright entity seen as 
acting in bad faith may also have difficulty in securing cooperation from its 
counterparts, which may be able to work together to frustrate the bad actors’ 
attempts at regulatory manipulation. Despite these potential constraints, 
instances of copyright arbitrage continue to proliferate, suggesting they alone are 
not sufficient to curb problematic copyright arbitrage. The next Section describes 
some recent examples of copyright arbitrage. 
II. 
COPYRIGHT ARBITRAGE 
Examples of copyright arbitrage date back to at least the jukebox.64 The 
“video showcasing” cases in the 1980s also demonstrate the phenomenon. Those 
cases involved video cassette rental stores operating in-store “showcases”— 
small booths in which a few patrons could sit and watch a video cassette copy of 
a film. The question in those cases was whether these screenings constituted a 
“public performance” as defined by Section 101 of the Copyright Act. The Third 
Circuit determined that they did, and that the showcases were just a ploy to avoid 
paying public performance royalties.65 
A few years later, the Ninth Circuit considered a strikingly similar business 
model—that of a hotel’s front desk renting videocassettes to guests to view in 
their rooms. The court distinguished this from the booths in Redd Horne and 
Aveco by noting that “[w]hile the hotel may indeed be ‘open to the public,’ a 
guest’s hotel room, once rented, is not.”66 This allowed hotel owners to design 
around the public performance right. 
The activity of copyright arbitrage has proliferated rapidly over the last few 
years. This Section first considers the impetus behind the recent proliferation of 
copyright arbitrage and then turns to six recent examples. 
A. The Impetus for Contemporary Copyright Arbitrage 
One explanation for the recent increase in copyright arbitrage is that the 
copyright industries, more so than industries affiliated with most other fields of 
 
 64. See supra Introduction. 
 65. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986); Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 66. Columbia Picture Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
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law, have been dramatically impacted by rapid technological development, in 
ways both positive and negative. As just one such example, the last few years 
have seen dramatic advancements in cell phone technology (especially cameras) 
and mobile applications that enable everything from music streaming to live 
program recording. The availability of these technologies impacts consumer 
preferences, challenges old business models, and provides an impetus for new 
ones. 
Importantly, the rapid pace with which these technologies evolve makes it 
difficult for copyright law to adequately address—or, in some cases, to address 
at all—the myriad legal concerns they present. This is a well-worn theme in 
copyright and entertainment: beginning with Sony67—in which the Supreme 
Court held time-shifting of television programming via Sony’s Betamax 
machine to be fair use—and continuing with Cartoon Network68—in which the 
Second Circuit held similarly with respect to an early DVR system—on through 
to Napster69—where the Ninth Circuit found the Internet’s first stab at P2P to 
amount to nothing short of mass copyright infringement—and beyond, 
technological developments have always challenged the boundaries of copyright 
law. 
In particular, the shift from analog to digital technologies continues to 
challenge the definition and import of key concepts in copyright law.70 For 
example, prior to the digital age, copies were of utmost importance because it 
cost a lot to make and sell them. A printing press, for example, had to invest a 
substantial sum in typesetting and assembling a book. No such investment is 
required to convert a file to a PDF and email it. In addition, a file backed up to 
the cloud may make “copies” of the underlying content, yet not constitute 
infringement.71 Similarly, in the days of in-person, synchronous performance, 
the question of whether a performance was public did not push legal boundaries 
the way on-demand streaming might.72 
Another explanation for the recent, rapid proliferation of copyright 
arbitrage is the disruptive impact technology has had on the business models of 
the information goods industries—i.e., movies, television, music and books. The 
last two decades have brought remarkable changes in the manner, ease, and 
speed with which users can access copyrighted materials, both legally and 
illegally. Social media platforms have changed the way we learn about, share, 
 
 67. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 465 U.S. 1112 (1984). 
 68. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 69. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 70. For a detailed analysis of this evolution, see Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s 
Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2002–2003). 
 71. For more on the challenges that digital technology poses to copyright doctrine, see Aaron 
Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011). 
 72. For more on the challenges posed by the digital evolution to fundamental copyright concepts 
such as reproduction, distribution, and public performance, see ROBERT BRAUNEIS & ROGER E. 
SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 991–93 (2d ed. 2017). 
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and create content. In turn, these developments have informed and influenced 
the preferences of consumers to which platforms are beholden, often in the 
absence of legal guidance. For example, Facebook initially introduced its “share” 
button without restriction as to what sort of content—including copyrighted 
content—could be posted and re-posted.73 
Finally, the heavily lobbied and piecemeal nature of copyright law—
described by one commentator as a “swollen, barnacle-encrusted collection of 
incomprehensible prose”74—has led to multiple instances of disparate treatment 
of similarly situated entities.75 The perceived inequities of such a regime also 
encourage gaming. 
For all of these reasons, copyright regulation—especially in the content-
licensing context—is notoriously complex, and subject to constant revision and 
uneven application. As a result, many players, including both licensors and 
licensees, have gone from trying to influence copyright’s labyrinthine rate-
setting procedure, to avoiding statutory licenses altogether. Prior work has 
discussed this move toward private ordering in copyright as potentially 
enhancing efficiency, while at the same time introducing both adverse selection 
and distributive justice concerns.76 
As a subversive form of private ordering, copyright arbitrage shares these 
advantages and disadvantages. Part III will discuss these possible implications 
in detail. First, the next Section will consider examples of copyright arbitrage of 
two different, frequently overlapping types: ontological (which encompasses 
most technological arbitrage in this space) and exploitative (which applies across 
the board to all instances). 
B. Examples of Copyright Arbitrage 
This Section discusses recent examples of copyright arbitrage. Some of the 
examples in this Section are ontological, meaning they involve an entity seeking 
to fit, or not fit, a regulatory definition so as to either avoid regulatory scrutiny, 
or to benefit from preferential statutory treatment. All of the examples might 
fairly be described as exploitative, which is to say that in addition to, or instead 
of, an entity working to manipulate its categorization or label, it affirmatively 
utilizes a statutory regime for purposes at odds with the statute’s legislative 
intent. Several of the examples fit into both categories. 
 
 73. See, e.g., Oliver Herzfeld & Marc Aaron Melzer, Fair Use in the Age of Social Media, 
FORBES (May 26, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2016/05/26/fair-use-in-the-age-
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 74. Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
 75. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the DSPRA’s disparate treatment of terrestrial and 
Internet radio). 
 76. See Kristelia A. García, Private Copyright Reform, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
1 (2013). 
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1. Section 114 Arbitrage: Pandora’s Terrestrial Radio Station 
Our first example is a clear exemplar of ontological arbitrage, wherein 
Internet radio service Pandora seeks to recategorize itself so as to save regulatory 
costs. ASCAP is the largest of three performance rights organizations (PROs) in 
the U.S. PROs like ASCAP serve as administrators and collection agents for 
public performance royalties, i.e., royalties incurred from the play of a song on 
analog or digital radio. 
There is no compulsory license for the public performance of musical 
compositions; instead, the rates ASCAP charges are set by its membership, 
composed of both individual songwriters and music publishing companies.77 
Challenges to those rates can be brought in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York (SDNY) in its capacity as “rate court.”78 
Challenges raised at the rate court take time, and there is no guarantee of success. 
Alternatively, a licensee like Pandora can engage in arbitrage in order to achieve 
a lower rate. 
Pandora is a digital radio platform and a licensee of ASCAP. In 2015, 
ASCAP’s going rate for digital licensees like Pandora was approximately 4 
percent of a licensee’s revenue.79 The going rate for terrestrial radio stations, 
including those owned by digital radio properties such as iHeartMedia,80 was 
less than half that at 1.7 percent. This reduced rate was the result of an agreement 
between ASCAP and the Radio Licensing Marketing Committee (RMLC), an 
organization that lobbies on behalf of commercial radio stations.81 In 2015—in 
an effort to recategorize itself from “digital radio station,” with a rate of 4 percent 
of revenues, to “terrestrial radio station with digital component,” thereby 
reducing its royalty rate to 1.7 percent—Pandora purchased a small, terrestrial 
radio station, KXMZ-FM, in Rapid City, South Dakota, for $600,000.82 The 
 
 77. A “music publisher” is a company that owns the copyrights on various musical 
compositions, and licenses the use of those compositions to such entities as radio stations, sports 
stadiums, filmmakers, restaurants, and record labels—traditionally through a PRO like ASCAP. The 
three major music publishers in the US today are Sony Music Publishing, LLC, Universal Music 
Publishing Group, and Warner Music Publishing. See, e.g., Ed Christman, Music Publishers’ 4th 
Quarter Report: Top 3 Companies Have the Same No. 1 Song, BILLBOARD (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7677913/music-publishers-4th-quarter-report 
[https://perma.cc/SY4C-Z8XJ]. 
 78. As amended in 2001, ASCAP’s consent decree (Second Amended Final Judgment or AFJ2) 
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 81. McAlone, supra note 79; see also David Oxenford, Details of the ASCAP Settlement with 
the Radio Industry—What Will Your Station Pay?, BROADCAST L. BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012), 
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investment was a no-brainer for a company who was paying out nearly half of 
its revenue in total royalties.83 
The applicable statute doesn’t prohibit Internet radio stations from 
expanding into the terrestrial space, but it also doesn’t contemplate them doing 
so for the express and stated purpose of manipulating their royalty rate. In an op-
ed penned by Pandora’s then-assistant general counsel Chris Harrison, Pandora 
made little attempt to characterize the transaction as anything other than 
ontological copyright arbitrage: 
[W]e have encountered many attempts by the incumbent industry 
players to undermine Pandora’s mission to connect millions of fans with 
the music and artists they love. These organizations seek to impose 
unprecedented royalty increases that are neither reasonable nor 
competitive. . . . Terrestrial broadcasters and their Internet properties 
were given preferential treatment via a January 2012 agreement between 
the Radio Licensing Marketing Committee (RMLC) and ASCAP and 
BMI. To put this in perspective, at least 16 of the top 20 Internet radio 
services that compete with Pandora operate under the RMLC license 
that has not been made available to Pandora. . . . So, today we are also 
announcing the purchase of KXMZ-FM, a terrestrial radio station 
broadcasting out of Rapid City, South Dakota. This acquisition allows 
us to qualify for the same RMLC license under the same terms as our 
competitors.84 
In other words, Pandora views its purchase of the terrestrial radio station as 
an appropriate response to the disparate treatment of Internet and terrestrial radio 
under the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 
(DPRSRA).85 In introducing a performance right for digital transmissions, the 
DPRSRA effectively established three pay tiers: (1) terrestrial broadcast 
retransmissions are exempt from payment; (2) noninteractive Internet radio 
platforms are subject to the statutory license, with rates set (and adjusted at 
regular intervals) by the CRB; and (3) interactive Internet radio platforms must 
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negotiate directly with the content owners.86 This gives a distinct competitive 
advantage to existing terrestrial radio stations whose programming might later 
be rebroadcast online, while making it comparatively more expensive to operate 
a competing Internet radio service. From this perspective, Pandora could argue 
that it is merely leveling the playing field, and that in challenging the terrestrial 
broadcaster oligopoly, its arbitrage is actually a social benefit, or at least a 
rational response to preexisting arbitrage. The veracity of such an argument 
depends on whether we think there is social value in treating Internet and 
terrestrial radio differently, or if the dichotomy is solely the result of industry 
capture. 
2. Section 115 Arbitrage: Mass “Address Unknown” Notices of Intent 
Our second example describes an instance of exploitative arbitrage in 
which several licensees follow the letter of the law in a manner that may yield 
them regulatory savings not contemplated by the statute. Traditionally referred 
to as the license for cover songs—the purpose for which it was originally 
intended—Section 115 of the Copyright Act establishes a compulsory license for 
the use of musical compositions.87 The DPRSRA extended this license to digital 
distributions with the addition of Section 115(c)(3).88 Importantly for this 
example, Section 115(c)(3) allows digital streaming services to utilize the 
compulsory license for use of the musical compositions underlying the sound 
recordings played by their consumers.89 The statutory rate and terms are set, and 
adjusted at five-year intervals, by the CRB—a body of three appointed judges 
who serve staggered six-year terms—with input from interested parties.90 
In order to avail oneself of the compulsory license, Section 115(b) requires 
a prospective licensee to first file a Notice of Intent (NOI) with the copyright 
owner.91 Traditionally, owners of copyrights on musical compositions engage 
the licensing agency Harry Fox, or one of a couple other smaller agencies, to 
manage their catalog, and to collect and administer their statutory royalties under 
 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2012). 
 87. I.e., sheet music, or the underlying score to a song. Importantly, the Section 115 compulsory 
license does not apply to use of a sound recording, which is handled in Section 114. 
 88. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3) (2012) (adding that “[a] compulsory license under this section 
includes the right of the compulsory licensee to distribute or authorize the distribution of a phonorecord 
of a nondramatic musical work by means of a digital transmission which constitutes a digital 
phonorecord delivery, regardless of whether the digital transmission is also a public performance of the 
sound recording under section 106(6) of this title”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b)(1), 804(b)(4) (2012). A typical CRB ratemaking for phonorecords 
involves the filing of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from both copyright owners 
and platforms. See, e.g., Determination of Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords 
(Phonorecords III), Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, U.S. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY 
BOARD, https://www.crb.gov/rate/16-CRB-0003-PR/proposed-findings [https://perma.cc/FY2R-
7YVT]. 
 91. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) (2012). 
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Section 115.92 Likewise, prospective licensees will typically turn to Harry Fox, 
or a similar agency, in order to license repertoire that the agency manages. In 
such a case, the agency then issues an NOI to respective content owners on behalf 
of the statutory licensee. 
In either case, where no copyright owner or address can be identified from 
the registration records held by the Copyright Office, the prospective licensee 
(or its agent) can instead file an “address unknown” NOI with the Copyright 
Office, which maintains a list of such notices online.93 The purported goal of this 
list is to afford copyright owners the opportunity to identify themselves and to 
claim their royalties, while at the same time allowing for uninterrupted use of the 
occasional orphan work by licensees.94 The logistics of identifying and claiming 
an “address unknown” NOI have been questioned.95 Notably, the statute doesn’t 
have any kind of “reasonable” or “good faith” search requirement; a prospective 
licensee can limit their search to the Copyright Office’s public records only. 
Importantly, statutory royalties under Section 115 accrue only after a copyright 
owner has been identified.96 A prospective licensee who files an “address 
unknown” NOI therefore enjoys a period of gratis use up until the point that the 
content owner identifies and claims their content. A licensee who takes 
advantage of this gratis use period for content that isn’t actually “unknown” 
would arguably be engaging in exploitative arbitrage. 
Beginning in April 2016, Google, Pandora, Spotify, and Amazon, among 
others, began serving “address unknown” NOIs on the Copyright Office in 
unprecedented numbers. Specifically, these companies filed more than twenty-
five million NOIs in the eight months between April 2016 and January 2017.97 
 
 92. HARRY FOX AGENCY, https://www.harryfox.com [https://perma.cc/49F3-6XY2]. The 
Harry Fox agency was established in 1927 by the National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA) as 
the sole agency for licensing, collecting, and administering mechanical royalties. The agency was 
acquired by SESAC, one of three major music publishers in the US, in 2015. Most of the DIY 
alternatives to Harry Fox, such as RightsFlow’s Limelight, have been acquired by large content licensing 
platforms (in RightsFlow’s case, by Google/YouTube). A notable exception is Music Reports, an online 
platform for rights administration that reportedly administered $500M in 2016. MUSIC REPORTS, INC., 
https://www.musicreports.com/ [https://perma.cc/3VYA-VPEE] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018); see also 
Ed Christman, Publishing Briefs: Music Reports Inc. Administered Over $500M in 2016, BILLBOARD 
(March 2, 2017), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7709314/publishing-briefs-music-reports-
mri-warner-chappell [https://perma.cc/YZ8K-S2TY]. 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (2012). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See, e.g., CHRIS CASTLE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY—MASS NOIS (2010), 
https://musictechpolicy.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/castle-mass-noi-article-v-f.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7UZH-MYVV]. 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1) (2012). 
 97. The Copyright Office publishes all NOIs online. Section 115 NOIs Filed with the Copyright 
Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/licensing/115/noi-submissions.html 
[https://perma.cc/XBP3-4V2Y] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). For the avoidance of doubt, the exploitation 
of Section 115’s “address unknown” NOI protocol does not amount to perjury (since the addresses are 
technically not available on the Copyright Office’s public site as required by statute), but are still 
disingenuous at best (since, for example, Google could reasonably surmise that notice on use of a new 
track by Katy Perry could be served to the same party they served the last dozen Katy Perry track 
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That’s an average rate of roughly three million filings per month, suggesting an 
effort to shift the burden to rightsholders to assert their ownership rather than 
good-faith failures to determine who owns what, while allowing licensees to use 
the content for free unless and until it is claimed. Licensees maintain that it’s not 
unusual for them to receive incomplete data from publishing companies, and that 
in many cases this lack of information explains the need for filing “address 
unknown” NOIs. In a 2015 press release announcing their intention to build a 
better system than Harry Fox’s, Spotify notes: 
One of the most difficult challenges is the lack of accurate data as to 
who owns the rights to a specific track, especially when it comes to 
songwriter and publisher rights. In many cases, the ownership of the 
rights are [sic] not even finalized when a record is released; in many 
other cases, rights are held by multiple parties, rights change hands, and 
rightsholders remain entirely unclear.98 
Incomplete publisher information has always been a challenge, however, and 
might not fully explain the recent rapid proliferation of these notices. 
Indeed, if all of the filings were legitimate, this might simply suggest a 
problem of scale. Unfortunately, not all of the filings appear to be made in good 
faith. For example, a recent search of the Copyright Office’s Section 115 
“address unknown” database turned up a notice posted by Spotify for the song 
“The Window Up Above,” written by iconic country music artist George Jones.99 
As recorded by Jones, the track peaked at number two on the Billboard Hot 
 
notices). The twenty-five million notices received likely include many duplicates, and do not necessarily 
represent twenty-five million separate works. Although Rightscorp—the source of these numbers—only 
recently began tracking the number of such filings, all signs suggest this is a dramatic increase in filings. 
A likely explanation for the increase is found with a change to the Copyright Office’s internal policy for 
accepting such filings. As explained in a Billboard report: 
Until recently, [filing an “address unknown” NOI] was a time-consuming, work-intensive, 
and costly process. NOIs had to be filed manually, by paper and under a prohibitive pricing 
structure. . . . Also, the NOI for each song would need to be filed individually, although they 
could all be batch delivered to the Copyright Office. But about two months ago, the Copyright 
Office revamped the way it is willing to accept NOIs and changed its pricing structure. Now, 
NOIs can be filed on excel spreadsheets, with something like 20 columns of relevant data 
needed to be completed for each song. This electronic filing still requires an upfront fee of 
$75 but it now only costs 10 cents a track. So now, filing NOIs for 500,00[0] songs will only 
cost $50,075, instead of $1.000075 million. 
Ed Christman, Say You Want a Revolution? U.S. Copyright Office Modernizes Key Part of Digital 
Licensing, BILLBOARD (June 24, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7416438/us-
copyright-office-music-reports-compulsory-licensing-digital-notice-of-intent [https://perma.cc/GD6J-
7NST]. 
 98. Spotify Songwriters and Publishers Administration System, SPOTIFY (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://artists.spotify.com/blog/spotify-songwriters-and-publishers-administration-system 
[https://perma.cc/FR37-E486]. 
 99. Spotify USA, Inc., Section 115 NOIs Filed with the Copyright Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE (Mar. 10, 2018), available at https://www.copyright.gov/licensing/noi/files/Spotify USA Inc.-
2018.03.10-NOI.xlsx [https://perma.cc/XXH5-QCCW]. 
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Country chart in 1961, where it sat for thirty-four weeks.100 In 1975, Mickey 
Gilley’s recording of the same song was the number one hit single on the 
Billboard Hot Country chart for fifteen weeks.101 In other words, this is not an 
unknown song by an unknown artist uploading tracks from her parents’ 
basement. There are currently eighty-four George Jones albums available for 
streaming on Spotify,102 suggesting Spotify might otherwise be able to identify 
the rights holder for this song. 
Some commentators have labeled this behavior an exploitative misuse of 
Section 115’s “address unknown” NOI protocol: 
Whether their motivation is avoiding liability, avoiding royalties, or 
both, this means that Amazon, Google, Pandora and others pay no 
statutory royalties on any of the song copyrights in their millions of 
“address unknown” NOIs until the song copyright owner becomes 
“identifiable” in the “public records” of the U.S. Copyright Office.103 
How, exactly, can the filing of “address unknown” NOIs delay (and ultimately 
reduce) royalties paid by these companies? The answer lies in the language of 
Section 115, which instead of requiring a good-faith search of all available 
sources—Harry Fox, Google, etc.—directs a prospective licensee to the 
Copyright Office’s public records in order to identify the copyright owner.104 
Importantly, royalties do not begin to accrue unless and until the copyright owner 
claims the content. Thus, these commentators worry that the filing of mass NOIs 
is a pay-stall tactic. 
Exacerbating the problem, they suggest, is the fact that the Copyright 
Office is understaffed and overworked, with a tremendous backlog of 
registrations waiting to be processed. According to the Copyright Office’s own 
registration guidelines, the processing time for new registrations (i.e., 
registrations relating to newly released content) currently ranges from an average 
of seven to sixteen months.105 Older releases may also be affected, either because 
they were registered before 1978 (and so aren’t yet digitized and publicly 
searchable), or because they were never registered at all. Even a song whose title 
varies slightly from version to version can be affected—for example, there may 
be a registration for Prince’s song “Purple Rain,” but if the prospective licensee 
searches the database for “Purple Rain [Live],” it won’t turn up the track. 
 
 100. George Jones, Chart History: The Window Up Above, BILLBOARD, 
https://www.billboard.com/music/george-jones/chart-history/country-songs/song/837585 
[https://perma.cc/S6TR-NHEV] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
 101. Mickey Gilley, Chart History: Window Up Above, BILLBOARD, 
https://www.billboard.com/music/mickey-gilley/chart-history/country-songs/song/839176 
[https://perma.cc/DQ4J-EYSB] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
 102. Search conducted on March 24, 2018. 
 103. Chris Castle, Meet the New Boss: Tech Giants Rely on Loopholes to Avoid Paying Statutory 
Royalties with Mass Filings of NOIs at the Copyright Office, 33 ENT. & SPORTS L. 65, 65 (2017). 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (2012). 
 105. Registration Portal, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://copyright.gov/registration 
[https://perma.cc/EA7T-J9LL] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
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In any of these cases, an “address unknown” NOI could be exploited to 
avoid both infringement liability and royalty payment, even for properly 
registered works. In the meantime, SoundExchange—a PRO for digital 
performance royalties—has launched a specialized search engine to help artists 
find out if any of their works are among the sixty million reported NOI filings 
with the Copyright Office.106 
Section 115’s “address unknown” NOI protocol was designed to permit 
continuity of use for the occasional orphan work, and as a means of enabling 
rights holders for those works a second chance to make themselves known. It 
was not intended as a means of punishing content owners for an understaffed 
Copyright Office.107 If these accusations are accurate, this seems a clear example 
of problematic copyright arbitrage. While the backlog and staffing problems at 
the Copyright Office cannot be attributed to Google et al., the alleged bad faith 
involved in taking advantage of the circumstances may be. In such a case, this 
would suggest problematic copyright arbitrage. 
Another explanation for an increase in the number of “address unknown” 
NOIs filed might not be indicative of problematic arbitrage at all. Instead, 
evolving business models and consumer interest in streaming services may have 
exacerbated extant backlog caused by incomplete publisher data. There is some 
evidence to suggest that some licensees, such as Spotify, have established a so-
called “pending and unmatched” or “P&U” account for these unmatched 
mechanical royalties: 
Due to a combination of the song-by-song mechanical licensing regime 
in the U.S. and a lack of reliable publishing information, many songs 
that are streamed on Spotify cannot be matched with publishers to earn 
royalties, and the money accrues as P&U. . . . Third parties like 
RightsFlow have stepped in to alleviate the problem, but even then only 
75% of P&U royalties are matched. Israelite [President and CEO of the 
NMPA], confident that Spotify is acting in good faith, affirmed that the 
NMPA is undergoing talks with Spotify to reach a settlement so that the 
large pool of money can be distributed among NMPA member 
publishers. Israelite indicated that there will be a claims process in 
which member publishers can manually claim their ownership of the 
 
 106. The SXWorks website describes the tool as intended to make it “easier for publishers and 
songwriters to search notices sent to the U.S. Copyright Office by indexing each filing into a searchable 
format so they can find potential uses of their musical works and seek royalties.” NOI Lookup, 
SXWORKS, https://www.sx-works.com/noi-lookup [https://perma.cc/J2WC-SXF8] (last visited Dec. 
21, 2018); see, e.g., Dan Rys, Searching for Unclaimed Royalties Is About to Get Easier for Music 
Publishers with New SXWorks Database, BILLBOARD (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8070540/soundexchange-sxworks-searchable-database-
copyright-office-nois [https://perma.cc/KS8D-3CVX]. 
 107. An Epsteinian argument might be made that equates the Copyright Office’s delay in posting 
notices to a government taking; however, the implications of such an argument are outside the scope of 
this Article. 
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unmatched songs and receive their portion of the P&U money.108 
If true, this explanation is less indicative of exploitative arbitrage and more 
indicative of a good faith attempt to accrue and distribute mechanical royalties 
at some point in the future. 
3. Section 109(a) Arbitrage 
a. ReDigi’s Second-Hand Digital Music Marketplace 
Part II.A defined regulatory arbitrage as technical compliance with the 
letter of the law, if not the spirit. In the case of ReDigi, the “technical 
compliance” piece is yet to be finally determined.109 A colorable argument has 
been made that the statute at least doesn’t explicitly prohibit the business model 
in question; more tenuous is the contention that the business model complies 
with the alleged spirit of the law.110 This example considers a business model 
that purports to allow for the sale of “used” MP3s, without an effective means of 
avoiding the making, nor retention, of copies in violation of Section 106.111 
Launched in October 2011, ReDigi markets itself as “the world’s first and 
only online marketplace for digital used music.”112 Specifically, ReDigi offers 
its users a platform to “sell their legally acquired digital music files, and buy 
used digital music from others at a fraction of the price currently available on 
iTunes.”113 In other words, ReDigi aspires to be a virtual record store, in which 
consumers swap MP3 files instead of vinyl records. 
The statutory basis on which ReDigi relies is Section 109 of the Copyright 
Act, commonly known as “the first sale doctrine.”114 Section 109 provides that 
“the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or 
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
 
 108. Anthony Manker, Recap: David Israelite, President & CEO of NMPA, COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
OF THE S. (Nov. 5, 2015), http://copyrightsocietyofthesouth.com/recap-david-israelite-president-ceo-of-
nmpa [https://perma.cc/267K-JA7W] (emphasis added). 
 109. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The 
Second Circuit has affirmed all relevant portions of this decision. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, 
Inc., No. 16-2321, 2018 WL 6518076 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2018). 
 110. I say “tenuous” not least of all because commentators disagree on what the “spirit of law” 
is. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Ass’n, Ass’n of College and Research Libraries, 
Ass’n of Research Libraries, and Internet Archive in Support of Reversal, Capitol Records, LLC v. 
ReDigi, Inc., No. 16-2321 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 2017) (arguing ReDigi’s resell of “used” MP3s constitutes 
fair use), with Brief for Amicus Curiae The Copyright Alliance in Support of Plaintiff-Appellees, Capitol 
Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., No. 16-2321 (2d Cir. May 12, 2017) (arguing that the first sale doctrine 
does not apply to ReDigi, nor is it fair use). 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 112. Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, ¶ 6, Capitol Records, 
LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-00095) [hereinafter Capitol’s 
Rule 56.1 Statement]. 
 113. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
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phonorecord.”115 It is the first sale doctrine, for example, that allows a student to 
sell her used textbook back to the university book store at the end of a semester. 
The bookstore acquires the textbook; the student leaves with cash (but no 
textbook). 
In other words, the conventional underpinning of the first sale doctrine is 
that the person who sells the good no longer has access to it. Unlike vinyl records 
or CDs, digital music files can be reproduced without deterioration of quality 
and shared without loss of the original copy. ReDigi seeks to ameliorate this 
“complication” by requiring its users to first download a proprietary software 
called “Media Manager” to their computers.116 Once installed, Media Manager 
analyzes the digital music files on a user’s computer to determine which are 
legally acquired, i.e. eligible for sale.117 Once the eligible files have been 
identified, the user can upload them to ReDigi’s “Cloud Locker”—a remote 
server located in Arizona—for sale on the platform’s website.118 
ReDigi asserts that once a file has been uploaded from a user’s computer to 
its Cloud Locker, Media Manager deletes the file completely from the user’s 
computer so that the data does not exist in both places at any one time.119 There 
are two potential problems with this. First, the process necessarily involves the 
making of an unauthorized copy of a file from the user’s computer in order to 
upload it onto the Cloud Locker server.120 In the absence of fair use, this infringes 
a rightsholder’s exclusive right of reproduction.121 Second, Media Manager can 
only scan for and delete files located on the computer to which the software is 
downloaded. It cannot search external drives or other hardware to which a copy 
of the same file could additionally be stored, such that it relies on the honesty 
(and/or, perhaps even more worrisome, competency) of the individual user.122 
Capitol Records was the first to bring suit against ReDigi for mass 
copyright infringement.123 At the district court, Judge Sullivan agreed with the 
record label, finding direct and secondary liability on the part of ReDigi, and 
 
 115. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 116. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, ¶ 8, Capitol 
Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-00095) [hereinafter 
ReDigi’s Rule 56.1 Statement]. 
 117. Id. Per ReDigi, a file is considered “legally acquired” if its metadata show that it was 
purchased (from iTunes or another ReDigi user). Files ripped from a CD, or downloaded from a P2P or 
bit torrent site are deemed ineligible for sale. 
 118. ReDigi’s Rule 56.1 Statement, supra note 116, ¶¶ 9, 11; Capitol’s Rule 56.1 Statement, 
supra note 112, ¶ 22. 
 119. ReDigi’s Rule 56.1 Statement, supra note 116, ¶¶ 14, 36. 
 120. Capitol’s Rule 56.1 Statement, supra note 112, ¶ 14. 
 121. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012). 
 122. Capitol’s Rule 56.1 Statement, supra note 112, ¶¶ 59–61, 63. 
 123. See Complaint, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 12 Civ. 0095), 2012 WL 32056 (alleging multiple counts of direct copyright infringement, 
inducement, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, and common law copyright 
infringement; and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions, as well as damages, attorneys’ fees 
and costs, and interest). 
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granting summary judgement to Capitol in March of 2013.124 The Second Circuit 
affirmed in 2018.125 
Putting aside alternate interpretations of Section 109, and the plethora of 
fair use issues that this case presents,126 at heart, ReDigi’s motivation can be 
described as copyright arbitrage: it is cheaper for ReDigi to offer its users a 
percentage of the sale price for tracks sold on the platform than it is for ReDigi 
to license those same tracks for sale from copyright owners. Under this 
characterization, ReDigi’s business model exploits the uncertainty of Section 
109’s application to digital goods, or, it applies form over substance. With regard 
to its violation of the reproduction right—which is incontrovertibly the case—
ReDigi’s argument flips to substance over form (assuming it could ensure the 
“substance,” i.e., the erasure of the original copy). 
Another characterization might describe ReDigi as engaging in “regulatory 
entrepreneurship”—i.e., a philosophy in which “changing the law [is] a material 
part of [a company’s] business plan.”127 Perhaps the service aims to highlight the 
differences between physical and digital copies—including the ease with which 
the latter may be reproduced and distributed, as well as an increase in 
durability—in an effort to encourage the law to treat them differently. While this 
is arguably a form of innovation, it is not without its downsides. For one thing, 
ReDigi—as with any profit-seeking actor—is looking to maximize its outcome, 
not that of society. This is not to say that ReDigi’s efforts might not have the 
opposite effect; namely, affording resale rights to owners of digital files might 
encourage greater consumption of digital goods. Such an outcome could still be 
characterized as rent-seeking on the part of ReDigi and could result in a quiet 
change of law without popular debate or consensus. Such regulatory capture 
might be avoided by redirecting copyright arbitrage efforts into a regulatory 
process. 
A broader question here is whether “purchasers” of digital files really 
“own” them. In their work on the subject, Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz 
explore how notions of ownership have changed in the digital context.128 The 
next example describes vendors of digital content advertising content for sale, 
where the fine print describes instead a conditional license, subject to revocation 
by the copyright holder. 
 
 124. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 125. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., No. 16-2321, 2018 WL 6518076 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 
2018). 
 126. For a balanced summary of the various issues presented, see, for example, Clark D. Asay, 
Kirtsaeng and the First-Sale Doctrine’s Digital Problem, STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (May 2013), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/kirtsaeng-and-the-first-sale-doctrines-digital-problem 
[https://perma.cc/VR28-Q6EH]. 
 127. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 30. 
 128. AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (2016) (noting, for 
example, that “buy now” often refers to a rental/lease in the digital context, rather than a traditional 
purchase with full ownership rights). 
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b. “Buy Now” Buttons for Licenses 
Upon locating an eBook to purchase on Amazon.com, consumers 
frequently encounter a button labeled “Buy Now.” A similar button labeled 
simply “Buy” is featured on the iTunes store for music downloads. If either of 
these buttons led to an actual purchase of content, Section 109(a) might apply, 
allowing the purchaser to freely sell, lend, or give away her copy.129 In both of 
these cases, however, terms of use and end-user license agreements—
automatically agreed to upon “purchase”—restrict all manner of transfer, making 
these transactions at best licenses.130 Amazon Kindle’s terms of service, for 
example, state: “Unless specifically indicated otherwise, you may not sell, rent, 
lease, distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or otherwise assign any rights to the 
Kindle Content or any portion of it to any third party . . . .”131 
In their study on the impact of “Buy Now”-style marketing, Aaron 
Perzanowski and Chris Jay Hoofnagle conclude that “[n]ot only are consumers 
misled [by the “Buy Now” buttons], they are misled about ownership rights that 
are important to them. A sizable percentage of consumers express a desire for 
those rights and many say they are willing to pay more to preserve them.”132 By 
utilizing a “Buy Now” message for what actually amounts to a license, these 
platforms and content owners are able to command a higher price for the 
content—a price that consumers would not be willing to pay if they understood 
what they were actually getting. As with ReDigi, this too is an example of 
ontological arbitrage of Section 109(a) in which platforms and content owners 
attempt to misclassify licenses as purchases in order to increase profits. 
4. Section 110(11) Arbitrage: VidAngel’s Filtered Streaming Service 
The next example of exploitative arbitrage involves a creative 
interpretation of statutory language concerning what is, and is not, an “authorized 
copy.” VidAngel is a streaming film service marketed to consumers wishing to 
filter out objectionable content. The company purchases multiple copies of 
physical DVDs of various copyrighted movie titles, then uses a software called 
AnyDVD HD to rip the movies from the DVDs to digital files in order to break 
them into filterable segments. Consumers then “purchase” a physical DVD from 
VidAngel for $20. VidAngel retains the physical copy on behalf of the consumer 
and streams the movie to the consumer’s television with whichever filters (for 
language, violence, nudity, etc.) they preselect. After viewing, the consumer 
 
 129. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 130. See generally PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 128. 
 131. Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON (Oct. 5, 2016), 
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 132. Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy Now, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 315, 322 (2017). 
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“returns” the DVD to VidAngel for a refund of the $20 “sales price” less $1–$2 
per night (depending on whether standard or high-definition play is selected).133 
In some cases, VidAngel offered movies for streaming that were otherwise 
only available via DVD, or for which the corresponding movie studios had 
licensed exclusively elsewhere.134 In addition, VidAngel consumers were 
initially able to forego selecting a filter altogether—or to choose an irrelevant 
filter, such as “filter out all Star Wars characters” for a non-Star Wars movie—
in order to watch films unfiltered. VidAngel eventually corrected for this by 
requiring at least one relevant filter.135 
Led by Disney, several movie studios brought suit against VidAngel for 
violation of their exclusive rights under the Copyright Act,136 as well as for 
circumvention of technological measures under the DMCA.137 VidAngel raised 
fair use138 as a defense, and also argued that its actions were exempt from 
copyright infringement under the Family Movie Act (FMA) of 2005.139 The 
FMA holds, in relevant part, that: 
[T]he making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a member of a 
private household, of limited portions of audio or video content of a 
motion picture, during a performance in or transmitted to that household 
for private home viewing, from an authorized copy of the motion 
picture, or the creation or provision of a computer program or other 
technology that enables such making imperceptible and that is designed 
and marketed to be used, at the direction of a member of a private 
household, for such making imperceptible, if no fixed copy of the 
altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer 
program or other technology.140 
The district court rejected VidAngel’s fair use argument and also found that the 
FMA didn’t apply since it was only applicable to filtered transmissions that come 
from an authorized copy of the film.141 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.142 
The applicability of the FMA to VidAngel’s business model turns on whether 
they are using an “authorized copy.” VidAngel argued that because the company 
started with a legitimately purchased DVD, the filtering was exempt under 
Section 110(11). The studios disagreed, noting that the copy ultimately streamed 
to consumers was ripped, and therefore not “authorized.” 
 
 133. For a detailed description of VidAngel’s system, see Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 
869 F.3d 848, 853–55 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 134. Id. at 854–55. 
 135. Id. at 854 n.3. 
 136. Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4) (2012). 
 137. Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 139. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2012). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 142. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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In other words, “VidAngel’s interpretation would create a giant loophole in 
copyright law, sanctioning infringement so long as it filters some content and a 
copy of the work was lawfully purchased at some point.”143 VidAngel’s 
exploitation of the FMA’s “authorized content” language would allow it to serve 
content to its consumers for a fraction of the price that a streaming license would 
cost, thereby amounting to copyright arbitrage. In this case in particular, 
streaming licenses are legal and readily available, albeit more costly, such that 
VidAngel cannot make a colorable argument that it is engaging in regulatory 
entrepreneurship. 
5. Section 106(4) Arbitrage 
a. Aereo’s “Private” Broadcasts 
This example of copyright arbitrage begins as an instance of exploitative 
arbitrage and evolves into an attempt at ontological arbitrage. Ultimately 
successful at neither, television streaming service Aereo offered its subscribers 
the ability to watch television programs in almost-real time. Aereo’s system was 
made up of thousands of small antennas—each dedicated to a single subscriber—
which would, through a transcoder, transmit content selected by the subscriber 
over the Internet. A subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive would then 
stream the show to the subscriber with only a few seconds delay.144 
Broadcasters sued Aereo for copyright infringement, alleging violation of 
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act, which gives copyright owners the 
“exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly.”145 Aereo 
maintained that it merely provided equipment to subscribers, who in turn 
performed the copyrighted work, and that in any case, each subscriber was 
assigned his own antenna and personal folder, so that any and all performances 
were private. As in the ReDigi example, Aereo sought to exploit ambiguity in 
the statute—specifically, its definition of “public performance.” 
In considering whether Aereo’s system “performed publicly,” the Supreme 
Court looked to the Transmit Clause, which holds that a work is performed 
publicly if (1) it is performed at “a place open to the public or at any place where 
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered”; or if (2) it is transmitted or otherwise 
performed “to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the 
member of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it 
in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different 
times.”146 
 
 143. Id. at 859. 
 144. For a detailed description of Aereo’s system, see Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014). 
 145. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012). 
 146. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court likened Aereo’s system to that of cable 
companies’ and held that Aereo, like cable companies, publicly performs.147 
Beaten but not yet defeated, Aereo next attempted to use the Court’s own 
language recognizing “the many similarities between Aereo and cable 
companies”148 to argue that it should be allowed to continue operating under 
Section 111, the compulsory license for cable companies.149 In other words, the 
company pivoted to an ontological arbitrage approach, and sought to fit itself 
under the statutory definition of “cable company” in order to take advantage of 
statutorily dictated royalties, a considerably more cost-effective option than 
negotiating a rate with disgruntled broadcasters.150 At the same time, Aereo 
specifically sought not to be labeled a “cable company” for the purposes of 
oversight by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)—a label which 
would require direct negotiation with, and payment to, broadcasters. This result 
is, after all, precisely what Aereo’s business model intended to avoid.151 
Unfortunately for Aereo, a subsequent letter from the Copyright Office held 
that Section 111 doesn’t cover “internet retransmissions of broadcast content,” 
thereby kicking the case over to the FCC.152 The FCC has been considering how 
best to define multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs)—the FCC 
equivalent of a “cable system”—since 2012 (i.e., before Aereo even came along). 
As of this writing, the FCC has sought comment, but has not yet issued a ruling, 
on an MVPD definition.153 
 
 147. The majority recognizes—and the dissent relies upon—a difference between Aereo’s 
system and a cable company: the latter transmits content constantly, while Aereo’s system waits to begin 
transmitting until a subscriber requests a program. Ultimately, the Court finds the distinction 
insignificant. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). 
 150. See Joe Mullin, Aereo: Hey, We’re a Cable Company After All!, ARS TECHNICA (July 10, 
2014), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/07/in-reversal-aereo-seeks-new-life-as-an-internet-
cable-company [https://perma.cc/VAC5-7S9H]. 
 151. See, e.g., Brian Fung, Aereo to the FCC: Let Us Join the Cable Companies We Tried to 
Replace, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/10/13/aereo-to-the-fcc-let-us-join-the-cable-companies-we-tried-to-
replace/?utm_term=.6c3e14cd6dc4 [https://perma.cc/A73J-URCQ] (“By accepting the label of MVPD, 
Aereo would also need to start negotiating with broadcasters over content, or ‘retransmission’ fees—
which is precisely what Aereo’s original business model was designed to avoid.”) 
 152. Letter from Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, Gen. Counsel & Assoc. Register of Copyrights, 
United States Copyright Office, to Matthew Calabro (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_Copyright_Office_letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6DSV-C2MH]; see also Brian Fung, No, Aereo Isn’t a Cable Company, Says the 
Copyright Office, WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/07/17/no-aereo-isnt-a-cable-company-says-the-copyright-
office/?utm_term=.d789269b7cc0 [https://perma.cc/W82S-LVWV]. In the meantime, a district court 
has sided with the Copyright Office in denying Aereo access to the compulsory license in Section 111. 
See Bill Donahue, Aereo Can’t Use Compulsory License, Judge Says, LAW 360 (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/589934/aereo-can-t-use-compulsory-license-judge-says 
[https://perma.cc/J55E-V8S5]. 
 153. See In the Matter of Promoting Innovation & Competition in the Provision of Multichannel 
Video Programming Distribution Services, 29 FCC Rcd. 1547 (2014). The FCC has still not moved on 
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If Aereo is found to fit that definition, it would seem to contradict their 
entire purpose for being. Still, Aereo has said that it would accept such a finding, 
presumably because their real goal is a rework of the entire regulatory regime.154 
The potential problem with this is the same as with any so-called regulatory 
entrepreneur: Aereo’s legislative agenda is concerned with maximizing its 
profits and minimizing its costs, not with net social welfare. 
Interestingly, the Aereo decision hasn’t stopped copycat services from 
trying their hand at live “re-broadcasting.” In early 2018, nonprofit Sports Fans 
Coalition launched a service called Locast.org that livestreams fifteen local 
channels to all five of New York City’s boroughs.155 The company claims to be 
different because (a) it doesn’t charge; and (b) it serves an otherwise unserved 
population: namely, New Yorkers unable to receive a free, over-the-air broadcast 
signal.156 
b. Downloads, Samples & Public Performances 
This example involves ontological arbitrage around the definition of 
“perform” in the Copyright Act. In 2007, ASCAP attempted to collect public 
performance royalties on downloads of MP3s, on downloads of movies and 
television episodes containing copyrighted music, and on thirty-second song 
samples offered to prospective consumers prior to purchase on iTunes’s music 
service.157 To understand the significance of this attempt, it is helpful to look to 
the Copyright Act itself. As discussed in the Aereo example, a copyright owner’s 
exclusive right to public performance comes from Section 106(4), which says 
that “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights . . . to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly. . . .”158 Section 101 defines “perform” as 
“recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or 
process” and defines “publicly” as: 
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
 
this issue; the definition proposed in the rulemaking would significantly expand the FCC’s media 
regulation authority (a move considered somewhat unlikely to succeed in any case). 
 154. See Fung, supra note 151. 
 155. David Lumb, Aereo-like NYC Nonprofit Locast Streams Local TV for Free, ENGADGET 
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/01/19/aereo-like-nyc-nonprofit-locast-streams-local-
tv-for-free [https://perma.cc/YW38-T77W]. 
 156. FAQs, LOCAST (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.locast.org/news/faqs [https://perma.cc/PT5N-
YCHG] (“As in other urban areas, tall buildings often make it difficult to receive an over-the-air signal 
in an apartment or condo. Technical changes to broadcasting have made it harder to get a signal—the 
transition to digital broadcasting changed the signal propagation characteristics of over-the-air signals 
and the recent ‘incentive auction’ at the FCC in which some broadcasters sold their licenses while others 
will have to change their frequency contributed to this trend. . . . Locast.org helps to keep the promise 
of public access to local broadcasting . . . .”). 
 157. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Applicants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 607 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(No. 41-1395), 2007 WL 7012850. 
 158. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012). 
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family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place 
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or 
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places 
and at the same time or at different times.159 
What songwriters and music publishers sought with their motion, then, was 
the classification of downloads—be they MP3s, or audiovisual episodes 
containing copyrighted music—as “public performances” for the purposes of 
earning royalties on them under Section 106(4). At the time, the NMPA 
explained the effort as premised on equivalence: 
If you watch a TV show on broadcast, cable or satellite TV there is a 
performance fee collected . . . [b]ut if that same TV show is downloaded 
over iTunes, there’s not. We’re arguing that the law needs to be clarified 
that regardless of the method by which a consumer watches the show 
there is a performance right.160 
On its face, this characterization seems both reasonable and defensible, but 
it doesn’t tell the full story. As the Digital Media Association (DiMA)—a trade 
organization representing platforms that use music, such as iTunes and 
Pandora—countered at the time: “Songwriters are getting paid. They’re paid 
sync rights and (mechanical) rights. They aren’t getting paid for the public 
performance in a download because there is no public performance in a 
download.”161 
The question—whether a download triggers the 106(4) exclusive right of 
public performance, thereby (and importantly) removing the use of the musical 
composition from the compulsory license—went before the SDNY in its 
capacity as rate court. Finding a download more akin to a reproduction than a 
performance, the court held: 
Although we acknowledge that the term “perform” should be broadly 
construed, . . . we can conceive of no construction that extends it to the 
copying of a digital file from one computer to another in the absence of 
any perceptible rendition. Rather, the downloading of a music file is 
more accurately characterized as a method of reproducing that file.162 
 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 160. Greg Sandoval, Music Publishers: iTunes Not Paying Fair Share, CNET (Sept. 17, 2009), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/music-publishers-itunes-not-paying-fair-share [https://perma.cc/9TJP-
5B82]. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Unites States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443–
44 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citations omitted). 
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The court noted that its interpretation is consistent not only with case law,163 and 
a statement from the Copyright Office,164 but also with legislative history: 
“House Report 94, which speaks in terms of the transmission and communication 
of performances, confirms the requirement of a ‘performance’ [rather than just 
transmission of data] to trigger the copyright owner’s right of exclusive 
performance under the Act.”165 In sum, Judge Connor determined: “We can 
discern no basis for ASCAP’s sweeping construction of § 101.”166 As such, the 
court rejected ASCAP’s attempt at ontological arbitrage of Section 106(4). The 
Second Circuit affirmed.167 
6. Section 512 Arbitrage 
a. YouTube’s Alleged “Value Gap” 
Because YouTube qualifies for a statutory “safe harbor” under the 
copyright laws, and as a result effectively pays considerably less than its 
competitors for the same copyrighted content, the company has been accused of 
taking advantage of a so-called “value gap.” Up to this point, the examples 
discussed have all involved a deliberate decision on the part of a platform or 
content owner to either lower costs or raise revenues via regulatory 
manipulation. This example also involves regulatory avoision resulting in lower 
costs for a platform, but lacks the element of intentional planning. Nonetheless, 
it is included here as an example of a problematic disparity caused by an 
outpaced regulatory regime without a strong regulatory apparatus. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was enacted in 1998.168 It added, 
among other things, Section 512 to the Copyright Act.169 Section 512 establishes 
a “safe harbor” for online service providers (OSPs) who comply with specified 
requirements. This safe harbor allows OSPs, like YouTube, to avoid copyright 
liability for infringing content that is uploaded to a provider’s platform by a user 
(user-generated content or UGC) without the knowledge of the OSP; or, upon 
receipt of a notice informing the OSP of the infringing content, is promptly 
removed.170 The safe harbor was arguably intended to allow OSPs to operate, 
 
 163. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster 
users who download files containing copyrighted music violate plaintiffs’ reproduction rights.”). 
 164. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DCMA SECTION 104 REPORT, at xxvii-iii (2001) (“It is our view 
that no liability should result from a technical ‘performance’ that takes place in the course of a 
download.”). 
 165. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
 166. Id. 
 167. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
 168. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 169. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 170. OSPs wishing to take advantage of the DMCA safe harbor must designate an agent to 
receive takedown notices from content owners and establish a policy for effecting takedown of the 
infringing material. Notably, there is no requirement on the part of an OSP to make an affirmative 
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and to grow, without fear of crippling liability for copyright infringement 
effected by their users.171 
OSPs whose business models prominently feature user-generated 
content—such as YouTube—rely specifically on Section 512(c), which exempts 
“for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user 
of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for 
the service provider . . . .”172 For the purposes of 512(c), Section 512(k)(1)(B) 
defines “service provider” as “a provider of online services or network access, 
or the operator of facilities therefor . . . .”173 To date, the courts have determined 
that YouTube meets this definition.174 Competing digital streaming services, 
such as Spotify and Apple Music, do not provide a platform for hosting user-
generated content. As such, they do not meet the Section 512(k)(1)(B) definition 
of “service provider” and so do not qualify for the Section 512(c) safe harbor. 
Herein lies the rub. Without the benefit of the safe harbor, non-UGC 
hosting platforms like Spotify must engage in direct negotiation with content 
owners for use of their songs on the service.175 These negotiations have resulted 
in an average market rate for on-demand streams of roughly $7 per 1,000 
plays.176 This is seven times more than YouTube’s average streaming payment 
 
determination as to the legitimacy of user-uploaded content, nor is the takedown procedure required to 
prevent re-upload of the same, or similar, infringing material. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
 171. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 168, at 8 (“[W]ithout clarification of their 
liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed 
and capacity of the Internet. In the ordinary course of their operations service providers must engage in 
all kinds of acts that expose them to potential copyright infringement liability. For example, service 
providers must make innumerable electronic copies by simply transmitting information over the 
Internet. Certain electronic copies are made to speed up the delivery of information to users. Other 
electronic copies are made in order to host World Wide Web sites. Many service providers engage in 
directing users to sites in response to inquiries by users or they volunteer sites that users may find 
attractive. Some of these sites might contain infringing material. In short, by limiting the liability 
of service providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and 
that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to expand.”). 
 172. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012). 
 173. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2012). 
 174. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 39 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 175. Another part of the problem is that platforms like Spotify largely compete with YouTube’s 
Red service, but are not direct competitors with the free video service. 
 176. Todd C. Frankel, Why Musicians Are So Angry at the World’s Most Popular Music 
Streaming Service, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-musicians-are-so-angry-at-the-worlds-most-
popular-music-streaming-service/2017/07/14/bf1a6db0-67ee-11e7-8eb5-
cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html?utm_term=.43a7af9e28c5 [https://perma.cc/ZT38-AFW6]; see also INT’L 
FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT 2016: STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 23 
(2016), http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7NA-THLW] [hereinafter 
IFPI MUSIC REPORT] (providing a full breakdown of this figure) (“Public data suggests a striking 
disparity between the amount of revenues proportionately being returned to rights holders by two leading 
companies in the different sectors, namely Spotify and YouTube. From publicly-available data, IFPI 
estimates that Spotify paid record companies US$18 per user in 2014, the last year of available data; by 
contrast it is estimated that YouTube delivered less than US$1 per user to rights holders in 2015. These 
estimates provide a realistic illustration of the ‘value gap’ in practice.”). 
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of approximately $1 per 1,000 plays.177 This differential arguably stems from the 
existence of the safe harbor, which suggests a suboptimal (from the perspective 
of content owners) baseline for licensing negotiations: zero. This is because 
takedown of infringing content under Section 512 is temporary; both YouTube 
and content owners know that users will likely continue uploading and re-
uploading content to the platform such that the content will be available whether 
YouTube pays for it or not.178 
To be sure, YouTube relies on the Section 512 safe harbor for user-
uploaded content beyond music streaming, and its offerings are likely driven 
more by consumer demand than by strategy. As music streaming has gained in 
popularity on the platform, however, the backdrop of the safe harbor allows 
YouTube to forego the per-stream royalty typical of digital streaming licensees, 
and to instead offer licensors a share of advertising revenue.179 Those shares are 
typically substantively lower than going-rate per-plays for digital streams. 
YouTube recognizes as much, disclosing in its latest 10-K: “We rely on statutory 
safe harbors, as set forth in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the United 
States and the E-Commerce Directive in Europe, against copyright liability for 
various linking, caching, and hosting activities. Any legislation or court rulings 
impacting these safe harbors may adversely impact us.”180 
When advertising sales decline (or advertising rates decrease), content 
owners earn less money, but the use of their content does not decrease, which 
further reduces the effective per-play rate. In addition to allowing YouTube to 
potentially underpay for content, this model also arguably punishes content 
owners for a platform’s underperforming business model.181 
While a “market price” may be difficult to discern,182 the loophole at play 
in the YouTube example is not: Congress arguably intended Section 512 to foster 
 
 177. Frankel, supra note 176. 
 178. This ability to re-upload infringing content was previously limited to some extent by the 
voluntary graduated response system (commonly referred to as the “copyright alert system”) in which 
participating ISPs will send notices to repeat infringers, eventually leading to, for example, a throttling 
of the user’s Internet speed. That program was terminated at the beginning of 2017. See, e.g., Ted 
Johnson, Internet Service Providers, Studios and Record Labels Call It Quits on Copyright Alert System, 
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att-1201971756 [https://perma.cc/9BAU-THP2]. YouTube’s proprietary fingerprinting technology, 
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infringing content upon upload. See infra Part III.B. 
 179. Mathew Ingram, YouTube Pays Billions, But the Music Industry Says It’s Not Enough, 
FORTUNE (July 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/13/youtube-music-billions 
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 181. Of course, the same might be said of any ad-supported platform, such as a broadcast TV 
station. In any event, YouTube might contend that Content ID affords content owners the opportunity 
to monetize (however poorly) where there is no statutory requirement to do so. 
 182. Determining what YouTube “should” be paying, however, is difficult, not least of all 
because there is no “market rate” for OSP streaming, since it operates under the statute. By definition, a 
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the growth of Internet-based companies and services.183 Congress did not intend 
to afford certain platforms a competitive advantage over other similarly situated 
platforms,184 nor to deprive content owners of the ability to negotiate a fair rate 
 
market rate is determined in a market, and markets require both willing buyers and willing sellers. 
Because of the existence of the safe harbor—which obviates the need for OSPs to bother with 
licensing—there is no market (in the economic sense) for the licensing of these rights. There never has 
been, and there never will be, unless and until Section 512 is revoked (a highly unlikely and in any event 
ill-advised solution) or amended. 
  This means that we don’t know what the market rate is, or should be, for OSP streaming. 
What we do know is that a “negotiation” held in the shadow of the safe harbor lacks a willing buyer (as 
content owners claim to be competing with free content—meaning pirated or otherwise unlicensed 
content). As Warner Music Group’s CEO Steve Cooper put it: “There’s no getting around the fact that, 
even if YouTube doesn’t have licenses, our music will still be available but not monetized at all. Under 
those circumstances, there can be no free-market ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ negotiation.” Daniel 
Sanchez, Indie Labels Say Spotify Is Paying 3X Better Than YouTube, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (June 12, 
2017), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/06/12/merlin-spotify-more-youtube 
[https://perma.cc/PB2M-CUXS]. Nonetheless, Warner and YouTube reached an agreement in May 
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Deal . . . ‘Under Very Difficult Circumstances,’ MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/warner-youtube-sign-new-deal-difficult-circumstances 
[https://perma.cc/PV4F-LFMM]. 
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claim, a supra-competitive rate. The only way to eventually determine a market rate for public 
performance royalties is to do away with the Section 512 safe harbor, a decision which itself presents a 
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of others. 
  A recent dispute in music publishing is illustrative of this point. When two of the three major 
U.S. music publishers decided to withdraw their digital rights from ASCAP in order to negotiate private 
rates in the market, Sony—which at the time controlled roughly 30 percent of the market—began its 
negotiation with prospective licensee Pandora by stating: “[I]t’s not our intention to shut down Pandora.” 
In re Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The not-so-subtle 
implication was that Pandora could agree to the rate set by Sony, or face crippling copyright litigation 
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catalogues.” Id. For more on this dynamic, see García, supra note 62. 
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above what a willing buyer (i.e. Pandora) was willing to pay, and can be seen as a type of arbitrage on 
the part of the music publishers. The impact of this arbitrage is undoubtedly exacerbated by the 
oligopolistic nature of the music publishing industry, in which a mere three companies control over 60 
percent of the market. See Ed Christman, Publishers Quarterly: Sony/ATV Reclaims No. 1 Spot in 
Fourth Quarter of 2017, BILLBOARD (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8097545/publishers-quarterly-sonyatv-reclaims-no-1-
spot-in-fourth-quarter-of-2017 [https://perma.cc/HT4Q-8TBQ]. 
 183. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998) (discussing the purpose of Section 512 as 
“balanc[ing] the interests of content owners, on-line and other service providers, and information users 
in a way that will foster the continued development of electronic commerce and the growth of the 
Internet”). 
 184. To understand how YouTube qualifies as an OSP for the purposes of Section 512, while 
Spotify does not, even though the companies may be “similarly situated,” it is helpful to recognize 
YouTube as a participant in two different markets: UGC (which earns it the protection of the safe harbor, 
and in which Spotify does not compete) and official, paid-for content (for which it negotiates payment, 
2019] COPYRIGHT ARBITRAGE 237 
for use of their content. It might alternately be argued that Section 512’s notice 
and takedown procedure is functioning precisely as intended, and that the 
problem lies with the parties’ inability to predict the massive scale that it would 
eventually face. In either case, the use of Section 512 to lower royalty rates, 
however inadvertent, amounts to copyright arbitrage. The scale of this arbitrage 
is significant: YouTube accounts for nearly half of all music streaming,185 yet 
constitutes less than 4 percent of total streaming revenue earned by content 
owners.186 
This is not to suggest that YouTube is not a valuable platform providing a 
societal benefit, including as a popular distribution platform for content owners 
themselves. Indeed, another way to view YouTube’s lower rate is as a voluntary 
agreement to pay a price above zero (the effective “rate” under Section 512(c)). 
Rather, this Section is a call for a transparent and fairly-reached rate (if one is to 
be paid)—be it via private bargaining or administrative ratemaking—that is not 
coerced under the shadow of inevitable infringement by OSP users effectively 
immunized by the statutory safe harbor. 
b. Improper Takedown Notices 
In our final example, we see some content owners exploiting Section 
512(c)’s notice and takedown procedure by issuing inaccurate, outdated, or 
unfounded takedown notices.187 Some of these notices are generated 
automatically, without regard to fair use and other exemption analyses (in 
arguable contravention of Section 512(f)).188 In some cases, takedown notices 
are even misused to remove negative reviews of a work,189 or in an attempt to 
stop a so-called “suck site” on which consumers can post complaints about a 
company or product.190 
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A recent quantitative study found that roughly 30 percent of takedown 
notices issued by content owners are “problematic.”191 Specifically, the 
researchers identified roughly one out of every twenty-five notices in which the 
targeted content did not match the allegedly infringed work, “suggesting that 4.5 
million requests in the entire six-month data set were fundamentally flawed.”192 
Nearly 20 percent of the takedown notices analyzed raised fundamental 
questions about whether content owners had even accurately identified the 
allegedly infringed or infringing works, and suggested a failure to consider fair 
use.193 
By removing non-infringing content, even temporarily, content owners 
misuse the Section 512 takedown mechanism. This misuse can lower costs for 
content owners by eliminating the need to hire expensive attorneys to conduct 
fair use analyses, and may also allow some content owners to remove competing 
or negative content—an ability clearly not contemplated by the statute. On the 
other hand, content owners can argue that the alternative—an individual fair use 
determination for every piece of removed content—is cost prohibitive given the 
staggering volume of infringing uploads. 
All of the examples of copyright arbitrage detailed in this Section share a 
few key features: first, they all involve companies and/or content owners 
operating in an industry facing rapid technological advancement. This makes it 
difficult for the law to keep up. Second, each involves an entity subject to at best 
ambiguous, and at worst uneven, application of existing regulations. A perceived 
lack of “fairness” among similarly situated players goes a long way toward 
encouraging gamesmanship in the form of arbitrage, not least of all for its ability 
to overcome some of the reputational barriers to arbitrage discussed in Part 
II.C.3. Finally, many of the companies in these examples are—each in their own 
way—striving to fill a consumer demand not contemplated by the regulatory 
regime and not otherwise filled in the market. The next Section turns to discuss 
the implications of these conditions. 
III. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Copyright arbitrage may have broad-ranging implications for creators, 
content owners, users, and platforms alike. Different forms of copyright arbitrage 
may improve or decrease efficiency in the market, may have intended or 
incidental anticompetitive and distributional effects, may influence and/or 
 
(describing use of a takedown notice by a home building company to take down a suck site commenting 
on their work). 
 191. JENNIFER M. URBAN, JOE KARAGANIS & BRIANNA L. SCHOFIELD, NOTICE AND 
TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 2 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628 
[https://perma.cc/V4EA-EDRM]. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id; see also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (requiring fair 
use to be considered prior to issuance of a takedown notice under Section 512). 
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reinforce consumer expectations (for better or worse), and may serve to identify 
and, in some cases, even correct imbalances and inequities. This Section will 
discuss these possibilities in turn. 
One view of regulatory arbitrage is as a means of driving innovation: a 
company seeking to lower its costs by recategorizing itself, for example, may 
devise a new and improved way of doing something. In their work on innovation 
“sticks”—i.e., a threatened regulatory penalty for failure to innovate—Ian Ayres 
and Amy Kapczynski present the remarkable impact of Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) legislation in the emissions context as one such illustration.194 
Enacted by Congress in 1975, the CAFE standards set a fuel-economy standard 
in miles per gallon that auto manufacturers must meet in a given year, or face 
civil penalties.195 A comprehensive review of the program conducted in 2002 
found that since the standard’s passage, fuel economy had nearly doubled for 
passenger vehicles and had increased by 50 percent for light trucks.196 
Where special interests drive the passage of a particular statute in the first 
place, regulatory arbitrage may even work to ameliorate the resulting reduction 
in social welfare.197 This is because “[a]side from rent-seeking costs, political 
economists have noted that the content of lobbyist-influenced legislation is likely 
to be inefficient as well.”198 One relatively recent example from copyright is the 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), sometimes referred to as the 
“Sonny Bono Act” for the singer/congressman who supported it. The CTEA 
extended the term of copyright from life of the author plus fifty years to life of 
the author plus seventy years. For works for hire, the term was extended to 120 
years from the date of creation or ninety-five years from the date of publication, 
whichever is shorter. Some characterized the CTEA as “a windfall to the families 
and corporations that owned these lucrative copyrights,” notably, Walt Disney 
and its Mickey Mouse franchise.199 On one view, the extension sought by the 
CTEA simply aimed to bring the U.S. into compliance with the Berne 
Convention, where life plus seventy years was already the standard. Another 
view saw the retroactive extension as taking from the public domain without 
offering anything in return.200 
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Regulatory arbitrage that seeks to counter the CTEA’s social costs might 
therefore be socially beneficial. One example is the Internet Archive’s Sonny 
Bono Memorial Collection.201 The collection utilizes an obscure section of the 
Copyright Act—Section 108(h)—that allows libraries to scan and make 
available works published between 1923 and 1941 so long as they are not 
currently being sold.202 The purpose of the archive was to counteract what was 
perceived as overreaching on the part of CTEA advocates: 
[T]he silver lining of the unfortunate Eldred v. Ashcroft decision was 
the response from people to do something, to actively begin to limit the 
power of the copyright monopoly through action that promoted open 
access and CC licensing. . . . As a result, the academy and the general 
public has [sic] rediscovered the value of the public domain.203 
In other cases, regulatory arbitrage in the copyright context appears to 
simply contravene copyright’s purported goals of incentivizing creation and 
contributing to the public domain. This may be true even where the arbitrage is 
intended to combat extant inequalities. In contrast to the net-neutral wealth 
transfer common in economic arbitrage—Company A pays more, while 
Company B pays less—some copyright arbitrage involves wealth transfer away 
from the very creators or users that copyright purports to protect. While it is of 
course true that arbitrage doesn’t last forever—entities will engage in the same 
manipulations until the advantage afforded the original arbitrageur is depleted—
the intervening period can last long enough to distort incentives and lead to 
market inefficiency, anticompetitive behavior, distributive justice consequences, 
and inexorably altered consumer expectations. This Section discusses the 
potential implications of copyright arbitrage, both problematic and otherwise, in 
turn. 
A. Incentives & Inefficiency 
Problematic copyright arbitrage, like some other forms of regulatory 
arbitrage, can prove privately beneficial but socially wasteful. Some of the 
examples described in Part II involve, at their core, manipulation of existing 
regulations to secure a lower (or higher) price than might otherwise be obtained 
in the market. Depending on whether the statutory rate strikes the right balance 
in the first place, such activity may distort incentives and lead to market 
inefficiencies. 
YouTube’s utilization of the Section 512 safe harbor, for example, allows 
the company to “negotiate” with copyright owners in the shadow of a statutory 
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protection that effectively allows for gratis use of content uploaded by its users. 
Both parties come into the negotiation knowing that the content is going to be 
available on the service in some form or another regardless of the price ultimately 
reached. This backdrop arguably places content owners in a disadvantaged 
bargaining position vis-à-vis YouTube, and may result in a lower rate than they 
might otherwise have obtained if content owners could ultimately deny YouTube 
access to their content in the absence of acceptable terms. In addition, as 
YouTube’s market share continues to increase,204 it necessarily displaces higher-
paying services (i.e., any service not protected by the safe harbor), thereby 
decreasing the total royalties paid out to rights holders. 
The incentive theory of copyright would suggest that this can lead to 
disincentivization of creators and intermediaries, who in turn may produce less 
new content, thereby decreasing overall consumer welfare.205 Glynn Lunney has 
argued that this may not always be the case. In his work looking at the impact of 
decreased music industry revenues on creative production, he concludes that in 
the face of diminishing financial incentives, song production has actually 
increased.206 One explanation might be diversification on the part of increasingly 
risk-averse record labels; the conclusion remains the same in any case. 
The availability of copyright arbitrage may also disincentivize an otherwise 
failing company from improving its business model. Pandora’s losses, for 
example, doubled from $170 million in 2015 to $343 million in 2016,207 despite 
the lowering of its royalty rate via purchase of a terrestrial radio station. In 
another context, a business facing these odds might fail, making room for a more 
efficient and profitable business to take its place. Instead, copyright arbitrage 
effectively subsidizes these services by allowing them to use more content than 
they are able to pay “market” rate for. 
Among other things, this can allow nonviable platforms to present 
themselves to investors and shareholders as more successful than they actually 
are. In its 2016 annual report, Spotify reported $3.3 billion in revenue—up 52 
percent over the year before—and over 140 million subscribers, fifty million of 
which pay for a monthly plan (the remaining ninety million pay nothing).208 But 
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the company’s revenue growth has in fact slowed considerably, while its losses 
continue to grow. In 2016, Spotify’s net loss tallied $600 million, up from $257 
million the year before.209 The utilization of mass “address unknown” NOIs by 
Spotify allows it to pay fewer royalties, thereby presenting a rosier picture, at 
least temporarily. 
In Pandora’s case, even the (arguably artificial) depression of its royalty 
rate via purchase of the terrestrial radio station wasn’t enough to push it into 
profitability.210 To the suggestion that it ought to charge its users more (than 
nothing), the company would likely respond that it can’t simply do away with its 
free tier at this point. While it’s true that users can opt for the reasonably priced 
premium (i.e. ad-free) tier, Pandora Plus, for only $4.99 per month, or even 
Pandora Premium (which allows for on-demand listening à la Spotify) for $9.99 
per month,211 shockingly few do: of Pandora’s 76 million active listeners, less 
than five million were paid subscribers.212 Pandora set the market rate at “free” 
since its founding in 2000, thereby holding its competitors to the same price point 
and setting the market rate—and, importantly, consumer expectations—at an 
unsustainable level. 
In the case of large quantities of “address unknown” NOIs filed with the 
Copyright Office, licensees who aren’t accruing unmatched P&Us may 
effectively buy themselves a “free pass” for whatever period of time it takes 
either for the Copyright Office to catch up on its backlog and get the content 
registered and online, or for the content owners themselves to cull through 
literally millions of notices in hopes of identifying their content. Whatever the 
efficient level of remuneration for these content owners might be, we might 
reasonably assume that it is greater than zero. 
The increased volume of “address unknown” NOIs being filed also adds to 
the workload of an already-overburdened Copyright Office, which now has to 
sort through and post millions of NOIs.213 That staff time could be put toward 
the processing of copyright registrations, and the preparation of comments and 
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recommendations, for example. Likewise, content owners are burdened with 
searching through millions of filings in order to claim content that might belong 
to them. This is time taken away from the creation and distribution of artistic 
works. On the other hand, the filing of baseless takedown notices by content 
owners drains OSP resources that could be put to better use improving user 
interface and app functionality, for example. 
In addition, copyright arbitrage can inefficiently affect the price of both the 
regulated product, and the economic substitute. If ReDigi’s business model were 
approved, for example, the company could expect considerable growth in its 
consumer base. Unlike a used book, a “used” MP3 is exactly as good as a “brand 
new” MP3, so a rational consumer would be expected to buy from ReDigi over 
iTunes. This spike in consumer demand might allow for several possibilities: 
first, ReDigi might raise its prices, so long as they remain lower than iTunes’s. 
Over time, this might allow for a competitor to enter, pricing itself just below 
ReDigi, and so on, until a market price is eventually established. Because many 
users are likely to retain their music, the digital copies sold are essentially 
costless to them, making the “market” price the average cost per track for the 
digital music reseller (plus any opportunity cost). 
If all of this results in decreased sales for iTunes,214 it can respond in one 
of several ways: it can lower its prices (and with them, its profit margin). This 
may lead Apple to seek to renegotiate with content owners over royalties. 
Alternately, iTunes may raise its prices to compensate for the loss in volume. Or 
it might lobby Congress to amend Section 109 to exclude digital products (in 
hopes of eliminating ReDigi as a competitor). The company might even decide 
to join ReDigi in the “digital resale” market. All of these scenarios lead to the 
same end: less money for copyright owners. The incentive-access paradigm 
contemplates a copyright regime that aims to encourage creation while balancing 
access for users. To the extent we believe this balance is optimally calibrated, 
ReDigi’s style of copyright arbitrage is not an effective means of accomplishing 
this balance. Even where we feel less confident about the current regime’s 
balance calibration, copyright arbitrage that works to reduce incentives to 
creators is unlikely to prove efficient.215 
B. Anticompetitive Effects 
By virtue of the fact that not all companies are able or willing to engage in 
it, copyright arbitrage has the potential to function in an anticompetitive capacity. 
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Indeed, competitive advantage is often an end for which arbitrage is the means. 
For example, YouTube’s subscription music service competes head-on with 
Spotify’s, yet Spotify does not qualify for the safe harbor.216 Instead, it has to 
engage in direct negotiation with record labels, resulting in an average streaming 
rate of $7 per 1,000 streams, or seven times more than the streaming rate of $1 
per 1,000 streams paid by YouTube.217 This differential is sometimes referred to 
as a “value gap.”218 
The legislative history of the DMCA describes the purpose of the safe 
harbor as “encourag[ing] responsible behavior and protect[ing] important 
intellectual property rights.”219 The value gap arguably reflects a disconnect 
between the safe harbor’s original intent and YouTube’s current utilization 
thereof. In other words, “[t]he safe harbor was intended to protect passive 
Internet platforms with no knowledge of what its users are doing, not active 
music distributors like YouTube.”220 
In addition to securing a competitive advantage over competitors who do 
not qualify for the safe harbor, copyright arbitrage affords YouTube an unfair 
bargaining advantage vis-à-vis content owners. The Section 512 safe harbor 
effectively sets the baseline for licensing negotiations to “free.” The Recording 
Industry Association of America’s (RIAA) CEO and Chairman, Cary Sherman, 
described these negotiations in a recent interview: 
The way the negotiation goes is something like this: “Look. This is all 
we can afford to pay you,” YouTube says. “We hope that you’ll find 
that reasonable. But that’s the best we can do. And if you don’t want to 
give us a license, okay. You know that your music is still going to be up 
on the service anyway. So send us notices, and we’ll take ‘em down as 
fast we can, and we know they’ll keep coming back up. We’ll do what 
we can. It’s your decision as to whether you want to take our deal, or 
whether you just want to keep sending us takedown notices.” 
That’s not a real negotiation. That’s like saying, “That’s a real nice song 
you got there. Be a shame if anything happened to it. . . .” 
 
 216. In contrast with its free, ad-supported service, YouTube’s paid services (currently branded 
as YouTube Music and YouTube Premium) pay for streams at a privately negotiated rate. While this 
may matter in the future, it is currently of little consequence: of YouTube’s estimated 1 billion monthly 
users, a mere 1.5 million bother paying for the service. See Micah Singleton, YouTube Is Still Having 
Trouble Getting People to Pay for YouTube, VERGE (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/2/13498470/youtube-red-subscribers-video-content-music 
[https://perma.cc/88WA-JFTT]. 
 217. Frankel, supra note 176. 
 218. The EU has formally recognized this “value gap,” while the jury is still out in the U.S. See 
European Commission Press Release, State of the Union 2016: Comm’n Proposes Modern EU 
Copyright Rules for European Culture to Flourish and Circulate IP/16/310 (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3010_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL5J-CWRJ]. 
 219. 144 CONG. REC. S4886 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 220. Cary Sherman, Medium: Five Stubborn Truths About YouTube and the Value Gap, RIAA: 
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.riaa.com/medium-five-stubborn-truths-youtube-value-gap 
[https://perma.cc/6DA5-MMZH]. 
2019] COPYRIGHT ARBITRAGE 245 
That’s what it’s like to negotiate, when somebody can claim the benefit 
of an expansive safe harbor. They’re taking the benefit of a safe harbor 
that was intended for people who were passive, neutral intermediaries. 
People like Verizon, where the content is just passing through their 
system. They’re not making money off of distributing content. YouTube 
does.221 
In other words, critics of YouTube’s utilization of the Section 512 safe harbor 
contend that “[i]t isn’t a level playing field . . . because ultimately you’re 
negotiating with a party who is going to have your content no matter what.”222 
In its defense, YouTube points to its proprietary Content ID system, a 
voluntary agreement between YouTube and certain qualified content owners. 
Content ID works by identifying potentially infringing uploads by comparing 
them to a database of songs verified by participating copyright owners. Those 
owners can then elect to either take the infringing content down (or prevent its 
upload, as the case may be), or to “claim,” or monetize, the advertising revenues 
associated with it.223 YouTube reports that most content owners opt to claim 
infringing content, rather than taking it down.224 The result of claiming is a per 
stream rate based on YouTube’s going ad rates—rates nearly seven times lower 
than the per-stream rates paid by YouTube’s competitors.225 
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Alternately, YouTube points to the licensing deals that it has in place with 
some content owners. While the terms of these licensing deals are not publicly 
available, rightsholders have suggested that these agreements were reached 
“under very difficult circumstances.”226 According to Warner Music’s CEO 
Steve Cooper, “There’s no getting around the fact that, even if YouTube doesn’t 
have licenses, our music will still be available but not monetized at all.”227 
Interestingly, elimination of the safe harbor might serve only to reverse the 
advantage by allowing content owners to demand above-market royalties against 
a backdrop of statutory damages for infringement.228 
Furthermore, successful copyright arbitrage—i.e., arbitrage that results in 
cost savings while surviving superficial regulatory scrutiny—by one company 
puts pressure on competitors to employ the same practices, or risk being 
noncompetitive. If everyone was willing and able to do so, this would eventually 
erode the competitive advantage gained by the original company. In practice, 
however, this is usually not the case. The same characteristics that normally 
advantage larger companies—e.g., capitalization and diversification—also 
support these companies’ superior ability to engage in copyright arbitrage. 
Small competitors of Pandora, for example, are unlikely to be able to afford 
to purchase a terrestrial radio station, leaving them to pay the higher royalty rates 
assigned to pure digital services. A new, upstart competitor to Spotify is less 
likely to have the staffing (or funding) required to prepare and file millions of 
“address unknown” NOIs, leaving it to forego a meaningful period of free 
content use, and to instead pay whatever rate it can negotiate directly with 
content owners (a rate necessarily higher than zero). 
This may sound like any other competitive advantage afforded a larger 
company with greater market power. When viewed through the lens of copyright 
arbitrage, however, these are not merely examples of a larger, better-funded 
company having an advantage over a smaller newcomer. In a functioning market, 
the aspiring competitor need simply distinguish itself—perhaps through some 
innovation or other—in order to compete, regardless of size disparity. 
Unfortunately, most content markets do not work this way. The reason for this 
is two-fold: first, there is the existence of the mini-monopoly that copyright gives 
to the rights holder of a work. Second, today’s content industries operate largely 
as oligopolies. The inability to reach an agreement with even one music 
publisher, for example, is very high-stakes: it would deprive a prospective 
licensor of roughly one-third (possibly more) of the content that its competitors 
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can offer.229 Similarly, a first-mover advantage augmented by arbitrage can set 
barriers to entry that foreclose, or at least strongly discourage, competition. The 
network effects230 common to copyright-related industries only serve to 
exacerbate this concern. To be sure, these concerns exist regardless of copyright 
arbitrage, but are invariably augmented by it. 
C. Distributive Justice 
Like all regulatory arbitrage, copyright arbitrage is a sophisticated activity. 
Companies who can afford better (paid) lawyers and financial advisors are more 
readily able to uncover and exploit arbitrage opportunities. These companies are 
also better able to deal with any potential blowback associated with the attempt. 
This enhanced aptitude for arbitrage serves to further widen the disparity 
between larger and smaller companies. 
This is not merely a fairness critique. Prior work has shown how this 
disparity in the copyright context affects not only smaller firms, but also 
consumers and society at large.231 For example, circumvention of Section 114 of 
the Copyright Act—the statutory license for sound recordings—includes 
circumvention of Section 114(g)(2), which mandates direct payment to artists.232 
This is an especially important entitlement for sessions musicians and backup 
vocalists who often rely upon this statutory payment as their sole compensation. 
Unlike monies collected under Section 114, monies collected under privately 
negotiated deals designed to circumvent this Section are not subject to this 
statutory distribution, and so are not required to make any payment directly to 
artists. The loss of this income could have a significant short-term impact on 
artists, as well as a long-term negative impact on creation and societal 
wellbeing.233 
YouTube currently enjoys the lion’s share of all streaming consumers, yet 
it pays the least of all the streaming services. First and most obviously, this 
means less money for creators and intermediaries—in direct contravention of the 
incentivization goals of copyright. This reduction in income could have 
significant, lasting impact on creative output to the detriment of consumers. 
Second, it introduces the risk that if and when Congress turns to replacing the 
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safe harbor with a statutory license, for example, the only “market rate” it will 
have to look to may be misrepresentative.234 In addition, proliferation of 
copyright arbitrage among larger industry players will place smaller companies 
and new entrants at a marked disadvantage by raising the barriers to entry and 
potentially reducing consumer choice and access. Without competition from new 
entrants, the potential for collusive behavior among oligopolists increases. 
D. Consumer Expectations 
Copyright arbitrage’s impact on consumer expectations is subtle, yet 
dramatic. In the first instance, copyright arbitrage can artificially depress (or 
raise) licensing rates for some not insignificant period of time. During that time, 
licensors or licensees (as the case may be) often sustain a loss, or at least a 
substantive reduction in revenues, while the other party is able to either present 
as viable a business model that otherwise might not be (in the case of licensees), 
or enjoy supracompetitive rates (in the case of licensors). 
During this time, consumer expectations are set. For example, ReDigi’s 
operation from October 2011 to March 2013235 gives users the understandable 
impression that resale of their digital goods is legal.236 Indeed, the company 
touted itself as “the world’s first pre-owned digital marketplace,” setting a 
“market rate” of $0.49 per track.237 Over time, this can lead to the cultural 
normalization of reselling digital goods, a practice which may very well turn out 
to be illegal. Likewise, both YouTube and Pandora offer consumers free, all-
you-can-eat music consumption. These ad-supported services—available to 
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consumers since 2005238 and 1999239 respectively—may well turn out to be 
financially unsustainable without the benefit of arbitrage. 
The real problem with all of this is that it is very hard to put the genie back 
into the bottle. File-sharing platforms like Napster, and P2P platforms like 
Kazaa, normalized access to individual songs anytime, anywhere. The eventual 
condemnation and dissolution of these platforms did little to dampen consumer 
appetite for the product, however. The resultant consumer behaviors and 
expectations are often credited, for example, as the impetus behind the 
development of streaming technologies.240 Some hail this as an exemplar of 
disruptive innovation;241 others lament the permanent reduction in valuation 
experienced by the music industry.242 This Article assumes both observations are 
true, but laments that to the extent streaming is propped up by arbitrage, it may 
only prove sustainable through continued arbitrage. 
E. Correction, Information-Forcing & Signaling 
The aforementioned implications assume problematic copyright arbitrage. 
As the examples show, however, even behavior that explicitly exploits a 
regulatory loophole may not necessarily result in a problem in need of a fix. It 
has been suggested that some sections of the Copyright Act might be 
intentionally vague,243 such that some instances of copyright arbitrage might be 
valuable in correcting an imbalance, and/or in signaling an inefficiency to 
Congress. 
As discussed in more detail in Part II, in the Pandora example, the 
company’s purchase of a terrestrial radio station for no business purpose other 
than rate manipulation arguably worked to challenge the extant terrestrial 
broadcaster oligopoly. Similarly, ReDigi’s behavior might be characterized as 
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regulatory entrepreneurship, wherein they highlight Section 109’s digital 
shortcomings to Congress in hopes of expanding the Section to cover digital 
goods. Even a blatant example of technological arbitrage such as Aereo’s might 
be alternately explained as providing a service to an underserved population. In 
all of these cases, copyright arbitrage may be viewed as providing a social 
benefit. 
IV. 
MITIGATION 
Where copyright arbitrage is deemed undesirable,244 its reduction or 
elimination lies with one or more of the judiciary, the legislature, an 
administrative body, or some combination thereof. Currently, “no agency exists 
with comprehensive and independent rulemaking authority in the area of 
copyright law.”245 This leaves the problem of copyright arbitrage, where there is 
one, to Congress and the courts, neither of which are institutionally well 
positioned to respond nimbly and accurately on their own. 
This Section begins by explaining the inefficacy of the current copyright 
regime when it comes to regulatory arbitrage as due in large part to a lack of 
responsive and efficient rulemaking. The next three sections discuss the pros and 
cons of several options available for identifying, and curbing, problematic 
arbitrage behavior: Subsection (b) urges courts to take a purposive, substantive 
approach in their interpretations of the Copyright Act. Subsection (c) calls for 
recognition of copyright as a complex regulatory system in need of a strong 
regulatory apparatus, and proposes that Congress empower a regulatory agency 
with rulemaking authority. It also considers what such a system might look like 
in practice and how it could work to mitigate the negative impact of copyright 
arbitrage. Finally, Subsection (d) acknowledges antitrust law as a backup for 
curbing copyright arbitrage resulting from legislative capture. 
A. Legislative Response 
Because copyright arbitrage is effectively noncompliance with the law, 
Congress is arguably in a position to curb it through legislation. Such legislation 
is a clean slate: copyright law does not currently have any explicit rules aimed at 
curbing regulatory arbitrage. As this Section demonstrates, however, Congress 
may not always be the ideal forum for correcting copyright arbitrage: first, 
Congress lacks the subject matter expertise and perspective necessary to identify 
and effectively mitigate regulatory manipulations in the copyright space. 
Second, the legislative process may be too slow and too cumbersome to respond 
effectively in the face of constantly evolving arbitrage efforts. Finally, but no 
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less importantly, Congress is prone to legislative capture, especially in the 
copyright context. 
1. Subject Matter Expertise 
When faced with a regulation, a regulated entity can either (i) comply; (ii) 
disobey and pay the penalty (monetary or otherwise); (iii) challenge the 
regulation (in court or via lobbyist); or (iv) exploit a loophole/engage in 
arbitrage. Economic theory tells us that a rational entity will pick whichever 
option is least costly. So, when an entity engages in arbitrage, we can assume it 
has been deemed the least costly option. In order to funnel entities away from 
problematic arbitrage, then, Congress needs to make arbitrage more costly than 
the other options. 
This analysis need not be done on a case-by-case basis, but likely should 
be conducted on a section-by-section basis. For example, if abuses of Section 
115’s NOI requirement are a concern, artists might be allowed to opt out from, 
or abusive entities might be suspended from use of, the compulsory license. 
An opt-out option is suboptimal because it undermines the transaction cost 
savings contemplated by the compulsory license. Indeed, the very basis for a 
liability rule—of which the compulsory license is an example—is to minimize 
transaction costs246 and to allow for more efficient bulk licensing of content and 
scalability of service: “A compulsory licensing scheme represents a real shortcut: 
it eliminates the need for private institution-building—a costly and time-
consuming process.”247 
On the other hand, suspension of abusive entities is attractive for several 
reasons. First, the compulsory license as currently drafted does not require a 
prospective licensee to submit to a credit check nor to otherwise make a showing 
of creditworthiness. This leaves content owners obligated to do business with a 
partner who may or may not hold up their end of the bargain (i.e., comply with 
the statutory requirements, and pay the statutory rate). At present, there is no 
penalty (aside from an unlikely lawsuit) for failing to comply with Section 115’s 
explicit requirements (i.e., failure to provide notice of intent and/or failure to 
pay), much less for abuses of the license. A copyright owner seeking to curb such 
abuses has to engage an attorney and file a lawsuit for copyright infringement. 
This places the burden on the nonoffending party, which is often not in a position 
to carry it.248 
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The preceding analysis requires: first, a detailed understanding of NOI 
practice under Section 115; and second, an appreciation for the power dynamic 
between licensors and licensees under the compulsory license. Congress does 
not have, and is not likely to attain, either of these sensibilities. 
Since the drafting of the 1909 Copyright Act, copyright has been 
understood as: 
[S]o complicated most members of Congress cannot understand it . . . 
Copyright legislation . . . has never been accorded the congressional 
staff or resources available for legislation on politically sensitive issues 
like tax or military appropriations. It may be that the impression that 
members of Congress cannot or will not spare copyright sufficient time 
to gain a thorough understanding has been a self-fulfilling one.249 
At the time of the Copyright Act’s contemplation in Congress, for example, 
Representative Paul C. Jones of Missouri remarked: “[T]he bill is so full of 
things that people do not understand about it, that cannot be understood, it should 
not be passed. . . . I have talked to members of the Committee on the Judiciary 
who admit they do not know what is in it.”250 
As discussed further at Part IV.C, Congress could instead empower an 
administrative agency to publish a biannual or quarterly list of “deadbeat” 
licensees whose access to Section 115’s compulsory license has been suspended 
for a period of, say, six months. This would at least slow the deluge of “address 
unknown” NOIs being filed by services like Amazon and Google, thereby 
allowing the Copyright Office a chance to catch its breath, while forcing these 
licensees to reconsider their approach to content licensing. 
2. Timeliness 
The speed with which technological innovations make their way to market 
and present arbitrage opportunities requires a quick and accurate fix. The 
traditional, time-intensive legislative process with its drawn-out hearings and 
solicitation of multiple reports and comments, does not lend itself to real-time 
correction of problematic arbitrage, especially not in the copyright context. 
Where copyright arbitrage is deemed desirable, on the other hand, Congress may 
be the perfect venue. Its slow, cumbersome processes allow time for the socially 
beneficial arbitrage to do its work. 
Indeed, the Copyright Act that we currently operate under was just over 
twenty years in the making. This included negotiations between industry 
representatives, “repeated, lengthy subcommittee hearings,” “numerous 
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executive sessions,” and “a flood of committee reports.”251 Likewise, the 
DMCA, added in 1998 in hopes of bringing copyright law into the new, 
technological age, was effectively obsolete by the time it went into effect. A 
more effective and streamlined process might instead see Congress empower an 
administrative body with rulemaking authority to correct abuses as they are 
uncovered in real time. 
3. Capture 
Lack of subject matter expertise and timeliness are not the only aspects of 
the legislative process that counsel against Congress as the optimal venue for 
curbing copyright arbitrage; the process by which copyright legislation has 
traditionally been drafted is also potentially problematic: 
[M]ost of the statutory language [of the 1976 Copyright Act] was not 
drafted by members of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the 
language evolved through a process of negotiation among authors, 
publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property 
rights the statute defines. In some cases, affected parties agreed upon 
language, which was then adopted by Congress, while disagreeing about 
what the language meant.252 
While the involvement of stakeholders can compensate for Congress’s lack of 
subject matter expertise, Congress is notoriously prone to legislative capture, 
particularly in the copyright context. To quote Representative Robert 
Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, speaking of the current Copyright Act: “Really, all 
interests in this bill are, in one form or another, special interests.”253 In her work 
on copyright reform, Jessica Litman recognizes “the political power of copyright 
lobbies, aided by members of Congress eager to be glamoured by famous 
entertainers and willing to be persuaded that the only fundamental problem with 
the United States economy is widespread piracy of American creations,” and so 
suggests a redistribution of rights from powerful intermediaries to creators.254 
One powerful example of legislative capture in copyright is the CTEA. That 
legislation, spearheaded by Walt Disney, extended copyright’s term by twenty 
years. Of the act, Herbert Hovenkamp wrote: 
It is hard to come up with any serious argument that retroactive 
extensions of old copyrights serve the constitutional purpose of 
promoting the progress of the useful arts. Those inventions and ideas 
have already been created. The Copyright Term Extension Act shows 
us Congress at its worst, passing legislation at the behest of powerful 
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interest groups at society’s expense.255 
William Patry, former counsel to the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property 
described the process this way: 
Copyright interest groups hold fund raisers [sic] for members of 
Congress, write campaign songs, invite members of Congress (and their 
staff) to private movie screenings or sold-out concerts, and draft 
legislation they expect Congress to pass without any changes. In the 
104th Congress, they are drafting the committee reports and haggling 
among themselves about what needs to be in the report. In my 
experience, some copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent 
members of Congress and staff interfering with what they view as their 
legislation and their committee report. With the 104th Congress we 
have, I believe, reached a point where legislative history must be 
ignored because not even the hands of congressional staff have touched 
committee reports.256 
In some areas of the law, regulatory loopholes allowing for arbitrage might even 
be the intentional result of legislation championed by special interest groups who 
support it only because they deem it sufficiently weak or ambiguous. An example 
might be the recently enacted tax bill, with its various opportunities for pass-
through income that is not scored by the Congressional Budget Office.257 To the 
extent that this practice may carry over to the copyright context, the very 
lobbying that enables it makes Congress poorly positioned to curb it. 
The nature of the legislative process as described herein, and its inability to 
keep up with technological advancements, is unlikely to change. Instead, where 
copyright arbitrage is deemed problematic, its negative impact might best be 
mitigated by a combination of (i) a more proactive judiciary, coupled with (ii) 
an empowered administrative body, and (iii) backed up by antitrust law. 
B. Judicial Response 
In the absence of congressional or administrative action directed at curbing 
problematic copyright arbitrage, courts stand as the first line of defense. We have 
seen judicial efforts at curbing potentially abusive practices, for example, in the 
ReDigi case.258 Recall that the arbitrage at play in ReDigi was the potential 
misapplication of Section 109’s first sale doctrine to digital resale. Section 109’s 
application to digital goods is unclear, not least of all because it was drafted and 
adopted before the existence of digital content. 
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The district court in ReDigi temporarily halted the potential misuse of 
Section 109 without making a determination of its application to digital goods 
one way or the other. It did so by focusing on the requirement in Section 109 that 
the good being sold be “lawfully made under this title,” and found the copy 
necessarily made by ReDigi’s Media Manager software to be unlawful.259 In so 
doing, it enjoined the arbitrage without ruling on its legality. This brand of 
indirect judicial response reserves to Congress the final interpretation and 
determination of the copyright laws, while reducing the damage arbitrage might 
bring about in the meantime. In other words, a temporary fix. 
Historically, copyright jurisprudence—particularly from the Supreme 
Court—has focused heavily, if not explicitly, on the equity of copyright doctrine 
to justify lawmaking in this area.260 Aereo is a recent example of this purposive, 
rather than overly literal, interpretative approach: there, the majority took the 
broad view in determining that since Aereo aimed to provide the same type of 
service that cable companies do, it should be treated like one (i.e., it should be 
found to perform publicly).261 Rather than leave it to Congress to plug the 
loopholes, courts could adopt the Aereo majority’s interpretative approach. To 
be sure, purposive judicial decisions may fail to account for industry changes, or 
may simply get it wrong. When combined with the legislative and administrative 
suggestions in this Section, some of these concerns may be at least partially 
ameliorated. 
There are other challenges to this suggestion too: to be sure, the judiciary 
could engage more purposively in cases of copyright arbitrage, but it often 
doesn’t. Perhaps this is because—as Part V.C details—copyright has become an 
increasingly regulatory body of law. Perhaps judges recognize that in many cases 
they are not institutionally well positioned to see the field in order to make 
adequate determinations. Or perhaps the difficulty in distinguishing “use” from 
“misuse” when it comes to the copyright statute has courts hesitant to overstep: 
“rather than resorting to open-ended considerations of utility or social welfare, 
to resolve indeterminate doctrinal puzzles, the Court’s copyright jurisprudence 
might [ ] be seen as consciously mediating extra-legal normative considerations 
through doctrinal ideas.”262 
Unlike the other two branches of intellectual property law—patent and 
trademark—copyright does not currently have a specialized tribunal. The 
authorization of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the only 
appellate-level federal court with the authority to hear patent appeals and 
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administrative trademark decisions afforded the opportunity for that tribunal to 
develop an expertise in the subject matter, allowing it to handle complicated, 
highly technical disputes.263 A tribunal specializing in copyright might afford 
similar benefits. 
In 2017, a bill was introduced that would establish a specialized copyright 
tribunal. Should some version of the Copyright Alternatives in Small-Claims 
Enforcement (CASE) Act of 2017 pass,264 we might see a more active role for 
the judiciary in copyright generally and in copyright arbitrage in particular. In 
the meantime, “we have seen a definite turn in IP enforcement away from 
common law adjudication of disputes and towards a regulatory state . . . .”265 
The move away from a common law copyright regime toward an 
increasingly regulatory one has been recognized in the literature: 
For many years, U.S. copyright law was based largely on a judicially 
administered, industry-neutral property rights regime. Congress was 
responsible for setting the property entitlement. The courts were 
responsible for defining and enforcing the entitlement. And the markets 
and private institutions were responsible for organizing the production 
of creative works in light of the property rights structure. The Copyright 
Office’s role was primarily ministerial, registering and tracking 
ownership of copyrighted works. 
In recent years, however, Congress has been much more willing to 
intervene in the structure of copyright markets. The 1976 Act departed 
from the pure property rights view by introducing detailed, industry-
specific exemptions and several complex compulsory licenses for 
certain industries. The Librarian of Congress was, for the first time, 
charged not only with registering copyrights, but also setting licensing 
rates, albeit in only a few industries. Since the 1976 Act, amendments 
to the Act have become increasingly more detailed and industry-
specific, relying more on compulsory licenses and, in some cases, 
mandating adoption of certain technologies and banning others. The 
Librarian of Congress’s duties have similarly expanded beyond mere 
registration, encompassing not only ratemaking but also substantive 
rulemaking. Recently proposed legislation, as well as academic 
proposals for significantly revamping the copyright system, also exhibit 
similar qualities. The trend is such that this mode of “regulatory 
copyright” is now the dominant mode of copyright lawmaking.266 
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The next Section acknowledges the debate over copyright’s status as a property 
right versus a regulatory regime, and suggests that the existence of copyright 
arbitrage supports recognition of copyright as a regulatory regime in need of a 
regulatory apparatus. 
C. Administrative Response: A Proposal 
Copyright’s status as either a property right or as a regulatory regime has 
been extensively debated in the literature.267 The significance of copyright’s 
status as stemming from property law or from legislation is that the former is 
superintended by the courts, while the latter can be best dealt with through an 
administrative agency. 
1. Copyright as a Regulatory Regime 
There is merit to treating copyrights like property rights: free market 
advocates, for example, would argue that it’s the only way to induce private 
ordering and with it, efficiency.268 But even the 1909 Act (predecessor to the 
Copyright Act that we operate under today) had moved away from a property 
right-centric view with the introduction of compulsory licenses and industry-
specific exemptions.269 The 1976 Act took copyright still further in a regulatory 
direction by charging the Librarian of Congress with rate-setting responsibility 
(a task currently delegated to the CRB). 
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The last couple of decades in particular have seen a marked increase in the 
regulatory nature of copyright.270 As Mark Lemley has observed, “Large swathes 
of the Copyright Act really are regulation: regulating price, setting compulsory 
licenses, determining what can be done, etc.”271 Tim Wu has described copyright 
as: 
[C]omprised of both authorship and communication regimes with often 
independent functions. The first regime is the familiar system, run by 
the courts, that grants exclusive [property] rights to encourage 
creativity. The second is a messier regulatory regime comprised mainly 
of the sections of copyright that have always perplexed copyright 
theorists and have never fit the central theme of author-incentives.272 
In practice, of course, copyright is both, although arguably it does neither very 
well: copyright simultaneously lacks the clean, common law lines of the 
Sherman Act and is riddled with heavily lobbied niche rules and ratemaking. As 
we are unlikely at this point to wipe the slate clean and start over, this Article 
suggests that the increasingly regulatory nature of copyright—and especially the 
emergence of copyright arbitrage—strongly supports recognizing copyright as a 
regulatory regime in need of a regulatory apparatus. 
While this move toward a regulatory regime allows for a great degree of 
tailoring and accommodation, it comes at the cost of flexibility and nimbleness. 
As Part IV.A demonstrates, Congress’s process may be too cumbersome to keep 
up with changes in technology and business models, much less to curb 
problematic arbitrage. Writing about the current Copyright Act, Melville 
Nimmer observed that “[w]here previously the statute had too little to say in 
many vital copyright areas, it may now be argued that it says too much. . . . [T]he 
flexibility and pristine simplicity of a corpus of judge-made copyright 
law . . . has now been replaced with a body of detailed rules reminiscent of the 
Internal Revenue Code.”273 
As such, Congress should take a note from other areas of the law that suffer 
from regulatory arbitrage—such as tax—and empower an administrative body 
with rulemaking authority comparable to that of the IRS. 
2. Call for a Regulatory Apparatus 
There are a few possible approaches to establishing an effective regulatory 
apparatus for copyright. These include a single-administrator approach, a full-
service agency, or some combination of the two. 
The IRS follows the single-administrator model. Under this model, the 
commissioner is a presidential appointee, employed at-will, under the oversight 
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of the White House. This allows the commissioner to clarify extant statutes and 
to function as an enforcement arm. This model would work well in the Pandora 
example, where the statute just requires clarification of, say, what proportion of 
revenues must come from each source to qualify for the lower rate. 
The FCC is an example of a full-service agency with multiple members and 
greater insulation from White House oversight. This model allows the agency to 
identify new breaches as they happen and to impose penalties. This model might 
be preferable in a case like ReDigi’s, where greater interpretative authority 
would be useful. 
Owing to copyright’s current organizational structure, both of these models 
face some challenges in the copyright context. Currently, the Copyright Office 
sits within the Library of Congress, and its Register is appointed by the Librarian 
of Congress, herself a presidential appointee.274 As such, the Copyright Office 
does not have independent rulemaking authority; instead, the Register can 
merely recommend regulations to the Librarian of Congress.275 Without clear 
authority and a means of enforcing its guidance, any arbitrage mitigation 
attempts undertaken by the Copyright Office could lead to less, not greater, 
clarity. 
Simply granting the Copyright Office rulemaking authority may not be 
sufficient to resolve this concern, however. There is a unique history of 
constitutional challenge to the Librarian’s appointment of officials tasked with 
administering the copyright laws. In a D.C. Circuit case from 2012, a disgruntled 
licensor challenged the constitutionality of the Librarian’s appointment of CRB 
judges as violating the Appointments Clause.276 That Clause requires all 
principal officers of the United States be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.277 In that case, the court initially found that the CRB 
judges were indeed acting like principal officers, in violation of the 
Appointments Clause. To correct this constitutional breach, the court amended 
the statute to clarify that CRB judges could be appointed and dismissed at will 
by the Librarian, making them inferior officers and thereby removing the 
conflict. 
Because the CRB is a department within the Library of Congress, as the 
Copyright Office is, and because the Librarian of Congress also appoints the 
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Register of Copyrights (without presidential nomination nor Senate 
confirmation), the concern is that similar allegations could be brought against 
the Register’s authority by someone unsatisfied with a particular rulemaking or 
enforcement procedure. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve 
the Article II challenge, one idea might be to move the Copyright Office to the 
Department of Commerce, where the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
sits. In this way, the Register of Copyrights could be presidentially appointed 
and senatorially confirmed. Bureaucratic difficulties aside, this arrangement may 
have the added benefit of more consistent treatment of all three branches of 
intellectual property. 
Alternately, as suggested by Sandra Aistars in her work on reformation of 
the Copyright Office, creation of a separate administrative body focused solely 
on copyright may be the option most likely to resolve the constitutional question 
definitively.278 Unfortunately, this administrative body would face some of the 
same challenges as the Copyright Office—namely, undue influence and 
capture.279 As there is little reason to believe the extant Copyright Office would 
be less beholden to industry interests if given rulemaking authority, establishing 
a newly constituted regulatory body may, at the very least, improve credibility. 
Drawing from examples in tax law, the next Section details what such a 
regulatory body might look like, and how it might operate in practice. 
3. Application 
A look into the practices of the IRS, the largest bureau of the U.S. Treasury, 
is instructive in the ways that a newly created administrative agency might 
address copyright arbitrage. The IRS has established several approaches to 
combat tax arbitrage: the form versus substance doctrine, the business purpose 
doctrine, the economic substance test (also known as the “sham transaction 
doctrine”), and the step transaction doctrine.280 The form versus substance 
doctrine allows the IRS to reclassify a transaction according to its substance, 
regardless of the form that it takes. The business purpose doctrine allows the IRS 
to challenge and disallow claimed business expenses for which it finds no 
legitimate business purpose (such as a nonexistent home office). A transaction 
satisfies the economic substance test if it has both substantive economic effects 
and a purpose other than reducing or avoiding tax. Finally, the step transaction 
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test enables the IRS to collapse a series of separate transactions into one single 
transaction for the purposes of determining the proper tax consequences.281 
Each of these doctrines involves an administrative agency redefining a 
transaction to bring it into line with regulatory intent. Extrapolating into the 
broader legal context, Leo Katz posits a common theory underlying each of these 
doctrines: the so-called “mismatch theory.”282 According to the mismatch 
theory, the assumption made by these doctrines is that legal rules are unavoidably 
imperfect, and therefore “doomed to be over- and underinclusive with respect to 
their true rationales.”283 Katz identifies two types of mismatches: limited 
foresight—the notion that “it is impossible for the rule maker to anticipate all 
situations in which the rule might have to be applied in the future”—and limited 
hindsight—the notion that “even where one is able to anticipate such situations 
in theory, it might be hard to determine when one is actually encountering them 
in practice.”284 Ultimately, Katz agrees with the conventional view that 
mismatches are “largely irremediable,”285 albeit for different reasons, which 
leads to the question: What do we do about them? 
Like the IRS, the newly created administrative body for copyright might 
devise a system of review that allows for undesirable arbitrage transactions to be 
redefined and reclassified, and so brought back under the regulatory umbrella. 
Pandora’s purchase of the South Dakota radio station, for example, would likely 
fail under a copyright version of the sham transaction doctrine.286 
In the tax context, the Treasury has also established both formal and 
informal procedures specifically addressing the arbitrage problem. One such 
formal mechanism is the annual “General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Revenue Proposals,” commonly known as the “Greenbook.”287 Released each 
fiscal year, these reports from the Treasury to Congress detail the agency’s 
proposals relating to various tax issues, including transactions identified as 
arbitrage. The Greenbook for FY2017, for example, includes, among others, the 
subheading “Other Business Revenue Changes and Loophole Closers.”288 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. Leo Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7–10 (2010). Use of the term 
“mismatch theory” in the loophole context should not be confused with the unfortunate use of the same 
term in the affirmative action context. 
 283. Id. at 7; see also Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 931, 932–33 (2003) (describing how legislative incompleteness can result not only from 
imperfect drafting, but also from technological or social changes). 
 284. Katz, supra note 282, at 7. 
 285. Id. at 2. 
 286. This conclusion is supported by the fact that as soon as the purchase failed to secure Pandora 
the rate reduction sought, they unloaded it at a loss. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 287. Links to Greenbook reports dating back to FY1990 are available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/general_explanation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5YZT-DBAX] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
 288. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 105 (Feb. 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7WX-TCXH]. 
262 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:199 
One recommendation under that subheading is titled “Conform Corporate 
Ownership Standards.”289 The recommendation aims to “conform the control test 
under section 368 with the affiliation test under section 1504.”290 The reasons 
given for this proposed change are instructive: 
By carefully allocating voting power among the shares of a corporation, 
taxpayers can manipulate the control test in order to qualify or not 
qualify, as desired, a transaction as tax-free (for example, a transaction 
could be structured to avoid tax-free treatment to recognize a loss). In 
addition, the absence of a value component allows corporations to retain 
control of a corporation but to “sell” a significant amount of the value 
of the corporation tax-free. Congress amended the affiliation test in 
1984 to address similar concerns regarding the manipulation of the vote 
and value of affiliated corporations. A uniform ownership test for 
corporate transactions will also reduce complexity currently caused by 
these inconsistent tests.291 
It is easy to imagine a comparable section in a “Copyright Greenbook” intended 
to close the exploitation of Section 115’s “address unknown” NOI requirement: 
By utilizing Section 115’s “address unknown” NOI for content whose 
registration has either not yet been processed, or not yet digitized, by 
the Copyright Office, prospective licensees can temporarily use that 
content without payment. In addition, the existence of this option 
reduces the bargaining power of content owners, who find themselves 
competing with free. Congress established the Section 115 license as a 
means of reducing transaction costs associated with the production of 
cover songs, and to guarantee payment to owners of the copyright on 
the musical composition in digital transmissions. A good faith efforts 
test for use of the “address unknown” NOI will foreclose misuse of the 
notice, while retaining the feature for its intended use. 
In the category of less formal administrative action, the IRS also maintains a 
running list of “Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions” on its public 
website.292 This allows for more expedient recognition and foreclosure of 
abusive arbitrage transactions than the more formal annual report. While the 
listing of a specific transaction doesn’t make it illegal per se, listed transactions 
require the filing of special disclosures that effectively shut those practices down. 
For example, a recently listed tax arbitrage transaction—“Revenue Ruling 
2003-6, Abuses Associated with S Corp ESOPs”—reads, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department understand 
that certain arrangements involving employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs) that hold employer securities in an S corporation are being 
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used for the purpose of claiming eligibility for the delayed effective date 
of § 409(p) of the Internal Revenue Code . . . . This revenue ruling alerts 
taxpayers and their representatives that the tax benefits purportedly 
generated by these transactions are not allowable for federal income tax 
purposes. This revenue ruling also alerts taxpayers, their 
representatives, and organizers or sellers of these transactions to certain 
responsibilities that may arise from participating in these 
transactions. . . . Transactions that are the same as, or substantially 
similar to, the transaction described in this revenue ruling are identified 
as “listed transactions” . . . transactions that are the same as, or 
substantially similar to, the transaction described in this revenue ruling 
may already be subject to the disclosure requirements of § 6011, the tax 
shelter registration requirements of § 6111 or the list maintenance 
requirements of § 6112 . . . . Persons who are required to satisfy the 
registration requirement of § 6111 with respect to the transaction 
described in this revenue ruling and who fail to do so may be subject to 
the penalty under § 6707(a). . . . In addition, the Service may impose 
penalties on participants in this transaction or substantially similar 
transactions, or, as applicable, on persons who participate in the 
reporting of this transaction or substantially similar transactions, 
including the accuracy-related penalty under § 6662, and the return 
preparer penalty under § 6694.293 
The listing of certain S Corp ESOP transactions does not prohibit them 
altogether—though it may flag them for Congress to do so—but it does single 
them out for special reporting and disclosure requirements. This effectively 
raises the cost of engaging in arbitrage: “It is bad news if a taxpayer’s transaction 
is on the list because it automatically triggers the registration and disclosure 
requirements, probably IRS examination, costly litigation, and a material risk 
that additional taxes and perhaps penalties will be owed.”294 Listing abusive 
transactions can also work to clarify which types of transactions are acceptable: 
“The good news . . . [is that] if the transaction is not listed, the tax shelter 
investor may be in better shape.”295 While not without its downsides, affording 
enforcement authority to the new regulatory agency might lend greater weight to 
such designations. 
A comparable listing of potentially abusive copyright transactions might 
likewise discourage copyright arbitrage, while working to improve predictability 
around legitimate transactions. For example, the administrative copyright 
authority might list “Use of Section 109 for Digital Goods” to ward off business 
models like ReDigi’s, unless and until Congress acts to clarify application of the 
first sale doctrine to digital information goods: 
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This agency understands that certain platforms claiming to establish a 
marketplace for the purchase and resale of digital content rely upon 
Section 109 of the Copyright Act. This listing alerts platform owners 
that Section 109’s exemption from copyright infringement for first sale 
does not apply to digital goods at this time. Transactions that are the 
same as, or substantially similar to, the transaction described in this 
listing may be subject to the following disclosure requirements. . . . In 
addition, the Copyright Office and/or the Librarian of Congress, may 
impose penalties on participants in this transaction or substantially 
similar transactions . . . . 
This guidance would confirm digital sales as outside the scope of Section 109 
(unless and until Congress acts to clarify otherwise), and would also lend 
predictability to reliance on Section 109 for nondigital sales. While private 
litigants may challenge these interpretations, administrative deference would 
still improve predictability. 
While the aforementioned administrative responses are a good starting 
point, they are not foolproof. If drafted too narrowly, parties may simply work 
around the listed transaction descriptions just as they do with existing 
regulations. Such work-arounds may cost them a bit more than the original 
arbitrage transaction, but still less than full compliance, and so they may still 
engage, albeit less efficiently and with more waste. In the tax context, this type 
of gamesmanship has been referred to as the “Tax Avoidance Game.”296 
Assuming the propensity for gamesmanship can be overcome, or at least 
mitigated, an administrative response coupled with enforcement authority shows 
the most promise in mitigating the negative impact of copyright arbitrage. This 
is especially true where antitrust law serves as a backdrop for curbing instances 
of copyright arbitrage occasioned by legislative capture, as described in the next 
section. 
D. Antitrust 
A final option for responding to problematic copyright arbitrage bears 
mention: antitrust. Whereas regulation may or may not promote competition—
especially in cases of industry capture, as is often cited in copyright—antitrust 
law can work to curb the anticompetitive effects of copyright arbitrage. In their 
work on antitrust and regulation, Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley define 
regulatory gaming as “private behavior that harnesses procompetitive or neutral 
regulations and uses them for exclusionary purposes.”297 Noting that “the 
existence of regulation can sometimes exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the risk 
of exclusionary behavior in regulated markets,” they use the existence of 
 
 296. George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from 
History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209 (2001) (discussing inefficiencies associated with the Tax Avoidance 
Game). 
 297. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 685, 687 (2009). 
2019] COPYRIGHT ARBITRAGE 265 
regulatory gamesmanship to support the need for ongoing antitrust oversight in 
heavily regulated markets.298 
Prior work has detailed the myriad challenges for antitrust in the copyright 
context.299 In order to operate effectively, antitrust requires a workably 
competitive market, something arguably missing from the copyright industries. 
The extent of regulation in copyright further serves to undermine antitrust by 
insulating incumbent firms from antitrust review.300 The IP context is 
particularly challenging for antitrust insofar as it grants a limited “monopoly” to 
copyrighted works. While these legally sanctioned monopolies are traditionally 
justified on a social utility basis,301 they still make effective application of the 
antitrust laws difficult. Antitrust, then, can serve as a helpful addition to—but 
not a replacement for—the judicial and administrative responses detailed herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Rapidly developing technologies and changing consumer preferences have 
led to a heretofore unexplored phenomenon in copyright law: regulatory 
manipulation aimed at reducing regulatory costs via manipulation of regulatory 
treatment. Calling these manipulations what they are—copyright arbitrage—has 
real value, as it directs attention to their economic and societal impact. In a 
functioning market, these issues might best be dealt with by doing nothing. 
Copyright is not such a market. Identifying the types of copyright arbitrage seen 
to date, and the conditions for and constraints thereon, sets the stage for 
lawmakers, administrators, and the courts to implement mitigation strategies in 
those cases where the behavior is deemed problematic. The move away from 
common law and toward a regulatory regime suggests a three-pronged approach 
to curbing the proliferation of problematic copyright arbitrage: a more proactive, 
purposive judiciary, coupled with a regulatory body authorized to engage in 
rulemaking, and backed up by antitrust law. 
This recommendation holds even when we recognize regulatory arbitrage 
as potentially encouraging socially beneficial experimentation. We can imagine, 
for example, a world in which ReDigi exposes the fact that application of the 
first sale doctrine to MP3s has little to no impact on the production or sale of 
digital tracks. A regulatory regime with rulemaking authority would not 
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necessarily prohibit the development of such a business model, but rather could 
work to bring it into line with statutory protections. 
To be clear, this conclusion assumes rules that best serve copyright’s 
delicate incentive-access balance. To the extent that copyright arbitrage may in 
fact be reacting to an imbalance, a rulemaking body would still be best positioned 
to consider a global amendment to the rules. Similarly, while mitigation of 
copyright arbitrage won’t eliminate all of the anticompetitive and antidistributive 
effects seen in the content industries, it can work to reduce the potential for 
negative impact. 
This Article’s call for the establishment of a stronger regulatory apparatus 
in copyright also speaks to a more general question: When should Congress 
delegate its rulemaking authority to administrative agencies? The conditions that 
allow for copyright arbitrage suggest a few criteria that may support delegation: 
first, an administrative body with rulemaking authority makes sense in areas of 
the law that especially benefit from specialization and in-depth context, as well 
as industry-specific knowledge. Delegation may also be indicated in fields with 
very active lobbies, and the concomitant vulnerability to legislative capture. 
Finally, the call for delegating rulemaking authority may be particularly acute in 
areas of the law in which the degree of statutory intricacy renders judicial 
intervention at best challenging, and at worse, ineffective. As an exemplar of 
each of these criteria, copyright is ripe for a stronger regulatory apparatus. 
